Read Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 for Free Online
Book: Read Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 for Free Online
Authors: Mark S. Thomson
Royal Staff Corps along with their Portuguese, Spanish and Hanoverian counterparts laboured throughout the war to keep a myriad of smaller river crossings operational.
The bridge over the Adour, from Douglas .
The rope bridge at Alcantara .
Crossing the river Adour in February 1814 required the construction of the largest boat bridge of the war. Over forty large local boats were used, held in place by five 13in cables. These were secured at one end by connecting them to a number of siege gun barrels and tightened using a capstan and pulley arrangement on the other bank. The design of this bridge bears striking similarities to the ones at Alcantara and Almaraz and must be attributed to Sturgeon and Todd.
Pontoon Trains
For the first part of the war, the Allies had very little mobile bridging equipment. Their only pontoon train was lost to the French when Badajoz was captured in March 1811. It is unlikely to be coincidence that Wellington wrote home on 31 March asking for a full pontoon train to be shipped out to the Peninsula. He was now commanding forces operating in two different theatres and it was essential that reliable communications were maintained between these two forces. Probably based on their excellent work over the past few weeks, on 18 April Wellington asked for two more companies of Royal Staff Corps to be sent out and noting that as ‘there are no people of the description of pontooneers belonging to the service, I beg that ten warrant artificers may be sent with the pontoons … who will be employed to superintend the persons who must be hired in Portugal to attend them [the pontoons]’. 4
The bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, by Leith-Hay .
A British pontoon .
A pontoon carriage needed eight horses and, I assume, a greater number oxen to move them even on good roads. Transporting the pontoon train was a massive undertaking as its components were very large, very unstable and very fragile. There was also no clear responsibility. A Royal Engineer officer was usually in overall charge, with the Royal Artillery responsible for the horses. No one took responsibility for the drivers whether they were hired locally, seamen or from the Corps of Drivers.
Lieutenant Piper RE, who commanded the pontoon train in 1812, reported that Portuguese seamen who had been attached to the pontoon train had no rations supplied to them. He also reported in December that year that most of the bullock drivers deserted through not being paid, Piper not saying if they took their bullocks with them. In the same letter he reported that the pontoons were rusting badly. A second pontoon train joined the army at the start of 1813. Writing in May 1813, Harry Jones reported the delays in its progress:
Piper was … left to himself without any assistance to be found … or any provision made against desertions of cattle, [i.e., the bullocks to pull the pontoon train] which unquestionably would be great from non-payment; so we are doomed always to labour under the greatest disadvantages of service and want of exertion on the part of those whose duty it is to provide us, or do their best, with everything that we may require. 7
In a return of May 1813, Fletcher described the pontoon train that was moving up for the Vitoria campaign. It comprised 48 wagons with 350 men, 520 oxen and 310 horses. He also recorded the breakages it suffered over a three-week period: 8
Problem
Numbe
Axle bed broken/repaired/replaced
40
Draft poles repaired/replaced
25
Carriage wheels repaired/replaced
64
Carriage/boat upset
14
Pontoon boats repaired
3
Total breakages
146
The pontoons continued to be a problem when they were in use. The poor design of the English pontoon, with a square bow, shallow draft and an open top, led to predictable results; they were prone to sinking. This happened spectacularly in early 1812 during the third siege of Badajoz. Several were recovered from the bottom of the river but some were lost. A new
The bridge over the Adour, from Douglas .
The rope bridge at Alcantara .
Crossing the river Adour in February 1814 required the construction of the largest boat bridge of the war. Over forty large local boats were used, held in place by five 13in cables. These were secured at one end by connecting them to a number of siege gun barrels and tightened using a capstan and pulley arrangement on the other bank. The design of this bridge bears striking similarities to the ones at Alcantara and Almaraz and must be attributed to Sturgeon and Todd.
Pontoon Trains
For the first part of the war, the Allies had very little mobile bridging equipment. Their only pontoon train was lost to the French when Badajoz was captured in March 1811. It is unlikely to be coincidence that Wellington wrote home on 31 March asking for a full pontoon train to be shipped out to the Peninsula. He was now commanding forces operating in two different theatres and it was essential that reliable communications were maintained between these two forces. Probably based on their excellent work over the past few weeks, on 18 April Wellington asked for two more companies of Royal Staff Corps to be sent out and noting that as ‘there are no people of the description of pontooneers belonging to the service, I beg that ten warrant artificers may be sent with the pontoons … who will be employed to superintend the persons who must be hired in Portugal to attend them [the pontoons]’. 4
The bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, by Leith-Hay .
A British pontoon .
A pontoon carriage needed eight horses and, I assume, a greater number oxen to move them even on good roads. Transporting the pontoon train was a massive undertaking as its components were very large, very unstable and very fragile. There was also no clear responsibility. A Royal Engineer officer was usually in overall charge, with the Royal Artillery responsible for the horses. No one took responsibility for the drivers whether they were hired locally, seamen or from the Corps of Drivers.
Lieutenant Piper RE, who commanded the pontoon train in 1812, reported that Portuguese seamen who had been attached to the pontoon train had no rations supplied to them. He also reported in December that year that most of the bullock drivers deserted through not being paid, Piper not saying if they took their bullocks with them. In the same letter he reported that the pontoons were rusting badly. A second pontoon train joined the army at the start of 1813. Writing in May 1813, Harry Jones reported the delays in its progress:
Piper was … left to himself without any assistance to be found … or any provision made against desertions of cattle, [i.e., the bullocks to pull the pontoon train] which unquestionably would be great from non-payment; so we are doomed always to labour under the greatest disadvantages of service and want of exertion on the part of those whose duty it is to provide us, or do their best, with everything that we may require. 7
In a return of May 1813, Fletcher described the pontoon train that was moving up for the Vitoria campaign. It comprised 48 wagons with 350 men, 520 oxen and 310 horses. He also recorded the breakages it suffered over a three-week period: 8
Problem
Numbe
Axle bed broken/repaired/replaced
40
Draft poles repaired/replaced
25
Carriage wheels repaired/replaced
64
Carriage/boat upset
14
Pontoon boats repaired
3
Total breakages
146
The pontoons continued to be a problem when they were in use. The poor design of the English pontoon, with a square bow, shallow draft and an open top, led to predictable results; they were prone to sinking. This happened spectacularly in early 1812 during the third siege of Badajoz. Several were recovered from the bottom of the river but some were lost. A new