[Transport Secretary] objected and TB, with GB and JS [Jack Straw] in full support, agreed to keep the airport shut and the flyover path over London shut too. GB at Cobra contributed when asked to, but otherwise pretty much sat there, or muttered out of the side of his mouth to Jack. He clearly hated it,possibly hated the fact that TB was so clearly in charge in these crisis management situations.
Lander said that Bin Laden was last thought to be in Kandahar three days ago. John Stevens [Metropolitan Police commissioner] said there were more than a thousand extra police officers on the streets. TB said he had talked to the Governor of the Bank of England [Eddie George] and they were keeping in contact about how to maintain confidence in the financial system, while the supply of oil was also being constantly monitored. Jack said that we should not get ahead of the US in terms of what we say. He felt our best role was to stay close and try to exercise influence privately. Afterwards there was a smaller meeting in TB’s office with Richard Dearlove (C) [chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), MI6], Lander, Hoon, Jack and Kevin Tebbit [permanent secretary, Ministry of Defence]. C said there was a significant international operation going on by us and the Americans and others that he was confident would show who was behind it.
TB commissioned a note on what Bush’s options were, saying he had to get inside his mind if he could. Hoon said al-Qaeda tentacles were all over the place – Africa, Chechnya, this wasn’t just about Afghanistan. There was also the view that the intelligent thing would be to wait several weeks but TB pointed out things were likely to move much more quickly than that. If the Americans are as convinced as we are that this is Bin Laden, there should be pressure put on to yield him up and if they refuse to co-operate, then he would be entitled to hit them. TB warned, following on from his phone call with Putin, that the Russians would essentially co-opt this whole event as justification for what they were doing in Chechnya. There was a discussion about recalling Parliament.
Later TB saw Scarlett and Lander and others to get a fuller briefing on Afghanistan and Bin Laden and how he operated. One of the experts from the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office], a total Arabist, came very close to saying the attack was justified, saying the Americans should look to their own policy on the Middle East to understand why so many people don’t like them. Scarlett said it wasn’t clear that OBL controlled all the training camps, but what he did know was that there was a very large supply of young men ready to die for the cause. It was also clear that there were likely to be would-be terrorists here as asylum seekers. Both C and Lander were very good on big picture and detail. They both felt Bush would need a few days for the Americans properly to assess all this stuff. TB and I agreed he should do a press conference, saying that Cabinet would meet tomorrow and Parliament on Friday. We worked on the scriptand went through various options of how to express the support he would give to Bush, which was pretty full on.
We got a message that Bush wanted to speak to him. It was a good call, Bush was pretty calm and TB very supportive. Bush said he was the first foreign leader he was speaking to and he would value staying in touch. He said the American people would give him a bit of time. TB said there might be a case for a G8. TB went over some of the things he had been saying to us, and Bush said he was grateful for the help and would appreciate if he put some of those thoughts in writing. Bush said the UN and NATO statements were ‘useful cover for the work that we would have to do’, by which I think he meant continuing intelligence gathering and then attack. He said this was ‘a new war, Pearl Harbor in the twenty-first century’. He said these people had to come out of their holes sometime. TB said he