Read The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries for Free Online Page B

said the real problem was lack of progress in the Middle East, the fact that so many people were willing to be suicide bombers, and she asked if we had the will to improve life for the Arab world. Patricia [Hewitt, Trade and Industry Secretary] briefed on oil and energy supplies, and was fairly confident. It was a good meeting, and I think people sensed TB was going to have an important role, not just here. Jack was doing fine on the media but agreed we would need to broaden the field.
    TB and I then spent a while working on his statement for tomorrow, though getting the right balance and tone would be the hard bit. Both Hilary Armstrong [chief whip] and Robert Hill warned him that the PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party] may be a bit dodgy on this and TB said ‘Are they mad? Do we just let these people get away with killing thousands of people?’ He said if this had been on British soil, just imagine the pressure for a swift response. Jonathan had brought in some interesting books on the Taliban which we were trying to read in addition to the material being provided by the spooks. TB sent a message to all Arab leaders. We did a TB article for about fifty regional newspapers in areas with large numbers of Muslims. There was the beginning of talk in the States about how TB’s response was better than Bush’s, which made him a bit anxious, and he recalled how [former US President Bill] Clinton had got a bit jumpy during Kosovo.
Friday, September 14
    David Manning [Blair’s newly appointed senior foreign policy adviser], who had been in the States at the time of the attacks, was now back. Quite a baptism. He gave a very good assessment of where the various bits of the American set-up were. He felt Bush was being fairly restrained but at some point that would stop. We had a meeting with TB, C, Lander, Francis Richards [director] of GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters, intelligence monitoring agency]. Everything pointed to OBL, training camps, possibly some help from the Taliban. The US clearly believed there was real evidence but we agreed it would not be possible to publish much of it. We left for the Commons, got the tone of the statement right and went over the difficult questions. TB did fine. IDS [Iain Duncan Smith, new leader of the Conservative Party] was OK but there were too many clichés and not enough smart questions. TB felt he was perfectly bright but lacking in real imagination. Our backbenchers were fine, and the Tories and Lib Dems basically onside for the approach he set out. TB was sure that ultimatum followed by attack if no response was the right way. Anji [Hunter, head of Downing Street presentation and planning] took a call from Will Farish, the new US ambassador [to London], specifically inviting some of us to the service at St Paul’s. We travelled up with Richard Wilson and John Gieve [permanent secretary, Home Office] and ended up in the front row, which was a bit embarrassing. [John] Major, [Margaret] Thatcher and [James] Callaghan [former Prime Ministers] were all there. GB was sitting next to IDS. It was a nice service. I chatted with Jamie Rubin [formerUS State Department chief spokesman, 1997–2000] at the end, who said the American right would use this as an excuse to do all sorts of things right round the world. Be very careful of these people, he said.
    Back at Number 10, TB, Jonathan, David Manning and I had a session pre TB’s phone call with Bush. TB was worried by the reluctance to have a G8, felt it showed they were looking inwards when they should be looking outwards. They should be using now to bind in Russia and France. He also felt we had to do more to bind in Pakistan, who were going to be absolutely vital in all this. The call took place at 1.45. It was clear that the wobbly Bush of the last call had become the hawk again. He said this was a war and they would win. They wanted OBL dead or alive. Afterwards TB seemed a bit alarmed, said ‘My God, fasten your seatbelts.’