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felt for him personally and Bush replied ‘I know what I’ve got to do. I’m not a good mourner. I’m a weeper. I’ll weep with the country but then act, but I don’t just want to hit cruise missiles into the sand.’ TB was a bit worried that the longer he waited, the more he would be expected to do.
    TB wrote off a note for Bush’s eyes only, which spelled out some of the problems we were facing and where Bush might go to build useful alliances. I felt Bush was almost Zen-like, almost too calm. Maybe he had decided he could wait longer than we thought. TB was sure we would need to do a lot more than just take out OBL. There was a second Cobra meeting with another discussion about whether to lift some of the restrictions. John Stevens said that the casualty figures were very vague but the UK casualties could be up to a thousand. TB agreed we should get out the possibility that figures could go into the hundreds. TB and Blunkett had a meeting on asylum with DB pushing hard for ID cards and detention centres. The general feeling was that TB was doing well. He was constantly telling us about bits of the Koran. Earlier we got the Muslim Council to condemn the attacks. Ben Wilson [press officer] started in the press office. What a day to start.
Thursday, September 13
    TB’s worry was that GWB would turn inwards. He had sensed a bit of resistance to the G8 idea, which he felt was a big mistake. He felt now was the time to bind in as much international support as possible. He felt a big military hit combined with a big international effort of support and a long-term agenda for terrorism was the way to go. There was a whole load more intelligence all pointing towards OBL.We went through to the Cobra meeting where we agreed we could wind down the emergency response. TB’s note to Bush was strong but he was not sure he would be receptive. TB had a meeting pre Cabinet with Jack S, Geoff [Hoon], [Admiral Sir Michael] Boyce [Chief of the Defence Staff, CDS] – who had replaced [General Sir Charles] Guthrie. I felt that with all the focus on the States, there was a danger we would neglect the Brits involved, and the fallout, which would be substantial, so suggested Tessa [Jowell, Culture Secretary] be used to sort out all that logistically etc. but also to be a kind of minister for helping families and victims. Jack was worried it would cut across the FCO stuff but I felt it needed a specific minister, specifically deputed. The Palace played the US national anthem at the Changing of the Guard while Prince Charles was visiting the embassy to sign the condolence book.
    Cabinet was very sombre, though Clare [Short, International Development Secretary] did her usual bit. TB was very much in charge. He said it was an act carried out in America which should be seen as an attack on the democratic world. Of the thousands killed, he feared several hundred would be British. He said all the evidence pointed to OBL. He said long term there had to be a strategy for dealing with Islamic fundamentalism but for the moment the focus was on finding the perpetrators, putting in place the security measures needed here, and assessing the financial implications for the world economy.
    Jack went through the diplomatic activity, said the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] had been easier to mobilise than the EU in some respects. On security, he said the problem was security is only as good as the weakest link. Blunkett went through all that was being done to protect public buildings, big computer installations and infrastructure sites. He said suicide bombers are notoriously difficult to plan for. He pointed out, as did others, the importance of reaching out to decent British Muslims. TB said there were three areas to focus on – whatever US military response is made, and our participation within it. Politics and diplomacy and in particular trying to get impetus into the Middle East peace process [MEPP]. And practical security arrangements. Clare