military chiefs—of the Russo-German Pact of 1939. Patient, correct, polished, outwardly imperturable but inwardly mystified and anguished, Grew had counseled moderation, in the hope that the military’s fortune would run out.
Adolf Hitler’s blitz through the Low Countries, the fall of France, the threatened invasion of Britain had echoed thunderously in the councils of Tokyo. Dutch, French, even British possessions seemed ready to be plucked. Impatient to seize the opportunity, military leaders in July 1940 had forced a moderate government to quit andhad established a new government under Konoye. A hard line was then set. In order to settle the “China incident,” Nationalist China’s supply lines were to be severed, which would mean a flanking move through Indochina. Such a move would in turn antagonize Washington and London and would require offsetting support in the West. Hitler and Mussolini, eager to divert American efforts into the Pacific, would readily accept a stronger Axis coalition.
Late in August, Tokyo extracted from Vichy an accord that recognized Japan’s immediate military interest in Indochina. In this pinch the French had turned to Roosevelt for help, but the administration, deep in a political contest, offered nothing but moralisms. Washington’s attitude was hardening, however—as was that of its man in Tokyo. In a cable that was to become famous as the “Green Light” message, Grew stated that “Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become unashamedly and frankly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion definitely threatens American interests in the Pacific.” Japan must be deterred no longer by words, but by American power.
Grew’s views strengthened the hands of those advisers who were urging Roosevelt to use his only immediate weapon. Late in September the administration decided on a complete embargo on all types of iron and steel scrap—but not on oil—to Japan and announced a new loan to China.
By now Tokyo was fishing in deep waters. For several weeks Matsuoka had been negotiating with the Germans over a tripartite pact. The burning question was the extent to which Berlin would recognize Japan’s sphere of interest. A hopeful list of acquisitions under Japan’s New Order had been drawn up: Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India, “etc.,” with Japan, Manchuria, and China as the New Order’s heartland. To Tokyo’s surprise and delight Hitler’s envoy had gone along with this list, except possibly for India, which might be reserved for Russia. The Germans made clear, however, that Japan must help them keep America out of the European war.
Supporting the treaty, Matsuoka stated flatly to the Privy Council: “Germany and Japan have a common aim in concluding this pact. Germany wants to prevent America’s entry into the war, and Japan a Japanese-American conflict.” But the elder statemen pondered Article 3 of the pact: “Germany, Italy and Japan agree…to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in theChinese-Japanese conflict.” Could war be prevented better by appeasing Roosevelt or through a show of coalition power? But it was too late for second thoughts; in September the Japanese signed the Tripartite Pact.
Publicly the United States had responded calmly to the news of the pact but an intense struggle over policy continued. The pact had bolstered the position of the hawks, who wanted a tougher line against Japan. The administration was divided, some members fearing that stronger measures—especially an embargo on oil—would precipitate a war that the country was not yet ready to fight. The President considered a number of
Adolf Hitler’s blitz through the Low Countries, the fall of France, the threatened invasion of Britain had echoed thunderously in the councils of Tokyo. Dutch, French, even British possessions seemed ready to be plucked. Impatient to seize the opportunity, military leaders in July 1940 had forced a moderate government to quit andhad established a new government under Konoye. A hard line was then set. In order to settle the “China incident,” Nationalist China’s supply lines were to be severed, which would mean a flanking move through Indochina. Such a move would in turn antagonize Washington and London and would require offsetting support in the West. Hitler and Mussolini, eager to divert American efforts into the Pacific, would readily accept a stronger Axis coalition.
Late in August, Tokyo extracted from Vichy an accord that recognized Japan’s immediate military interest in Indochina. In this pinch the French had turned to Roosevelt for help, but the administration, deep in a political contest, offered nothing but moralisms. Washington’s attitude was hardening, however—as was that of its man in Tokyo. In a cable that was to become famous as the “Green Light” message, Grew stated that “Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become unashamedly and frankly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion definitely threatens American interests in the Pacific.” Japan must be deterred no longer by words, but by American power.
Grew’s views strengthened the hands of those advisers who were urging Roosevelt to use his only immediate weapon. Late in September the administration decided on a complete embargo on all types of iron and steel scrap—but not on oil—to Japan and announced a new loan to China.
By now Tokyo was fishing in deep waters. For several weeks Matsuoka had been negotiating with the Germans over a tripartite pact. The burning question was the extent to which Berlin would recognize Japan’s sphere of interest. A hopeful list of acquisitions under Japan’s New Order had been drawn up: Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India, “etc.,” with Japan, Manchuria, and China as the New Order’s heartland. To Tokyo’s surprise and delight Hitler’s envoy had gone along with this list, except possibly for India, which might be reserved for Russia. The Germans made clear, however, that Japan must help them keep America out of the European war.
Supporting the treaty, Matsuoka stated flatly to the Privy Council: “Germany and Japan have a common aim in concluding this pact. Germany wants to prevent America’s entry into the war, and Japan a Japanese-American conflict.” But the elder statemen pondered Article 3 of the pact: “Germany, Italy and Japan agree…to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in theChinese-Japanese conflict.” Could war be prevented better by appeasing Roosevelt or through a show of coalition power? But it was too late for second thoughts; in September the Japanese signed the Tripartite Pact.
Publicly the United States had responded calmly to the news of the pact but an intense struggle over policy continued. The pact had bolstered the position of the hawks, who wanted a tougher line against Japan. The administration was divided, some members fearing that stronger measures—especially an embargo on oil—would precipitate a war that the country was not yet ready to fight. The President considered a number of
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