Read Quantum Night for Free Online Page A

long as she felt she could get away with, then: “Thank you. Now, the next passage, please.”
    I nervously opened the book again and flipped to the second marked page. At the top of it was a double-indented quotation from utilitarianism’s other founder, John Stuart Mill; I knew it by heart:
    Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
    It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
    But Dickerson hadn’t highlighted that. Instead, the blue marking began immediately afterward; I swallowed, then started reading aloud:
    “‘Mill’s key point is that we reasonably and correctly value the livesof a human more greatly than we do that of a chimpanzee, for the chimp, while perhaps enjoying the moment, cannot anticipate future happiness as well as we can—and that act of anticipation is in itself a pleasure.’
    “‘Likewise, we value a chimp—to the extent in many jurisdictions of outlawing their use in laboratory experiments—more than we value a mouse, a being of demonstrably lesser intellectual capacity. But to be fair, and to avoid a charge of speciesism, we must apply the same standards to our own kind.’
    “‘Yes, an embryo, from the moment of conception, is genetically fully
Homo sapiens,
but it has no complex cognition, no ability to plan or anticipate, and little if any joy. As it develops, these faculties will accrue gradually, but they clearly do not exist in anything approaching their full form until several
years
after birth. On the bases previously discussed, a utilitarian should support abortion when a prenatal diagnosis has been made that is strongly indicative of an unhappy, painful life; it is on this current basis—the lack of a fully developed mind for years to come—that a utilitarian can additionally embrace not just abortion but also a merciful release when a severe defect is not apparent until after parturition.’”
    “‘Parturition,’” said Dickerson. “A right fancy word, that.” She glanced at the jury. “For those of us more accustomed to plainer speaking, what is ‘parturition’?”
    “Childbirth.”
    “In other words, Mr. Marchuk, sir, you believe abortion is okay. You believe—and I find this almost impossible to say aloud, but it is what the indicated passage said, isn’t it? You even believe
infanticide
can be okay. But you
don’t
believe in capital punishment.”
    “Well, as Peter Singer would argue . . .”
    “Please, sir, it’s a yes-or-no question. Are you against capital punishment in all circumstances?”
    “Yes.”
    “Are you in favor of abortion?”
    “I’m in favor of increasing utility, in maximizing happiness, so—”
    “Please, sir, again: yes or no? In the vast majority of circumstancesin which a woman might desire an abortion, are you in favor of letting her have it?”
    “Yes.”
    “And are there even times when infanticide, when killing an already-born child, is, in your view, the right thing to do?”
    “On the basis that—”
    “Yes or no?”
    “Well, yes.”
    “And your goal here is to convince the good men and women of this jury that it would be morally wrong to execute the defendant?”
    I spread my arms. “I have no goal other than to explain the screening technique I developed, but—”
    “No, buts, sir. And no more questions. Your Honor, I’m very grateful to be through with this