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Pakistan. He had been persuaded by Bhutto’s argument that elected civilians could fight terrorism more effectively than could dictators such as Musharraf. Zardari conferred one of Pakistan’s highest civilian awards, Nishan-e-Pakistan, on Biden.
    Biden shared Obama’s position with Zardari. Obama would make a concerted effort to win the war in Afghanistan and to defeat Al-Qaeda, he said. Pakistan could help the United States in fixing Afghanistan, and in return the United States would help Pakistan address its fundamental problems. If the ISI broke its ties with the Taliban, the United States could prevail in Afghanistan with a lot less bloodshed. America’s next vice president was speaking of a “grand bargain” that wouldstrengthen a democratic Pakistan, benefit its people, and rid the region of terrorism.
    Zardari said that he could help only if he were sufficiently strong at home. He did not want to be hated “for being an American stooge.” He said that Pakistan needed “economic resources so that I can show the people that there’s something in it for them.” Biden said he understood Zardari’s political needs. As vice president, he would help get a significant aid package through Congress for Pakistan.
    But, Biden added, “If you do not show spine then all bets are off.” Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who was accompanying Biden, asked Zardari to end “the indecision that plagues your country.” Pakistan had to figure out its enemies and its allies, Graham said. “We’re your allies,” he emphasized; “We’re not your enemies.” When Zardari brought up the subject of India, Biden said that the change Americans sought included a fundamental transformation in Pakistan’s attitude toward India and vice versa.
    Soon after his inauguration Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke had brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other diplomatic achievements. He knew how to coax and bully recalcitrant foreign leaders. However, he abhorred war and conveyed genuine caring for the people of other nations. Although many Americans commented on his ego and his penchant for publicity, among Pakistanis he was seen as a master negotiator who made even the weakest leaders feel good.
    Holbrooke and I met the day his appointment was announced. He told me that his objective was “to ensure a successful end to the war in Afghanistan and a stable Pakistan and a stable Afghanistan.” He said that contrary to views expressed in some circles, the United States had no ulterior motives regarding Pakistan. “The US will never ask Pakistan to do anything that harms Pakistan’s national interest,” he remarked. But as a friend, the United States wanted to have “candid discussions about what Pakistan’s national interests and priorities might be.”
    Regarding India, Holbrooke said, “I will deal with India by pretending not to deal with India.” Then he added that India also came within the purview of his brief to the extent that it impinged on Pakistan andAfghanistan’s security. He asked me rhetorically if the United States could be “friends with both India and Pakistan at the same time.” He wondered if Hamid Karzai was the best man to lead Afghanistan under the circumstances and whether alternatives were available.
    Holbrooke said that Pakistan had become the focus of the policy community in Washington, and he did not envy my job. “Increased focus and scrutiny,” he commented, “raise questions to which there were no easy answers.” From that day Holbrooke and I became good friends. He assembled a huge staff drawn from various agencies within the US government as well as nongovernment advisers. He traveled frequently to Pakistan and around the world to drum up support for a