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weather grew cold and overcast. The next three days were even cloudier, and CAS was ruled out completely until March 29.
    April Fool’s Day
    Good weather for the Green Berets and their CAS missions was vital. Clouds, rain, and fog lead to poor visibility; heavy winds could affect accuracy. As demonstrated in the following excerpt from an ODA’s daily BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) journal, the correlation between weather and success is a strong one. It is particularly evident on April 1, when the Special Forces had the chance to target hundreds of Iraqi soldiers at once, had only the weather permitted.
    25 March 2003
    â€”Maintained observation of TAI 2 and OP site. No air due to weather—overcast.
    26 March 2003
    â€”Maintained two OP sites—Hill 725 overlooking TAI 2 intersection and vic LF531707 overlooking north of Ayn Sifni. Targets have been plotted but still no air.
    27 March 2003
    â€”0500Z, CW2 [censored] , SFC [censored] , and SSG [censored] move off OP site, move back to 12th Supay Barracks for refit, still no air.
    28 March 2003
    â€”0600Z, went to Duhok to speak to the CDR about air and then back up to Hill 725.
    29 March 2003
    â€”1400Z, Still operating OP on Hill 725 and established a new OP site vic. Peshmerga checkpoint below Hill 725. Received CAS with 2 × F-18s at 2030Z (dropped 2 × 500lb JDAMS & 6 × 500lb LGBU) on bunker complex N of Ayn Sifni. Then worked a B-52 w/ 12 × 2000lb JDAMS (dropped 6 bombs on EN positions at 2230Z, 24 EN KIA, 50 EN WIA and 6 bombs on a suspected logistics site).
    30 March 2003
    â€”1400Z, moved 3 man OP vic. 512673 still continue to observe TAI 2 from main OP on 725.
    31 March 2003
    â€”0400Z, CAS with 2 sorties; 2 × F-14s and 2 × F/A-18s 6 × 500lb bombs dropped vic. Hill 613 (5 KIA & 10 WIA).
    â€”1100Z, IZ moved two 57mm ADA pieces to the west of Ayn Sifni, OP on 725 worked 2 × F-14s dropping 8 × 500lb bombs—destroying 1 × 57mm. (AC [-130] had hard time identifying second 57mm and hit the destroyed 57mm 4 additional times).
    â€”1600Z, CAS with 2 × F/A-18s 2 × 2000lb JDAMS dropped on Hill 613, slightly off target.
    01 April 2003
    â€”0900Z, begin observation of what appears to be a withdrawal by the Iraqis from positions 5 kms south of OP 725, sent SALUTE to higher, requested CAS, “NO CAS” and then watched 500 Iraqi soldiers load 6 buses and safely depart area heading south towards Mosul.
    â€”1100Z, conducted recon along east ridgeline of Hill 725, for possible Raid.
    Kirkuk
    Route 4 runs from Chamchamal to As-Sulaymaniyah, going through a mountain pass with steep, near-impassable angles that are a fatal “choke point” to any attacking force. The Kurds had always held their ground here; the Iraqis had never made it up this far. If an armored force such as Saddam’s army ever made it as far as the pass on Route 4, it would be routed at once. The last great wide-open area was a ridgeline far to the south, which lay in front of Kirkuk. This was where the Iraqi Army had been massed for the last ten years.
    Oil-rich Kirkuk had been home to the Iraqi 8th Infantry Division and the Iraqi 5th Mechanized (Motorized) Infantry Divisions. Through the years of fighting against the Peshmerga, they had moved little by little up Route 4, all the way to the pass into As-Sulaymaniyah, where they could go no farther. What was now left was more a unit of stragglers than a combat-effective force. The Green Berets of 3rd SFG (A) made short work of the remaining Iraqi forces, with CAS in the first few days after they had arrived, though the Iraqis tried to hold their ground on Route 4. This showed the PUK that the operators were worth their weight in gold, and they took them up to where the real fight would be—Chamchamal.
    Chamchamal sat on the main road, some twenty-five miles east of Kirkuk City. The ultimate objective of seizing Kirkuk went hand in hand with 10th SFG (A)’s objective of