fierce warriors, though largely in the context of defending their own territory. The Peshmerga (or âPesh,â as the Green Berets took to calling them) belong to one of two key political groups in northern Iraq: the KDP, or Kurdistan Democratic Party (largely in the western Kurdish Autonomous Zone, where the 2nd BN 10th SFG were located), and the PUK, or Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (largely in the eastern Kurdish Autonomous Zone, where the 3rd BN 10th SFG were located). The KDP and the PUK, on and off again at war with each other, are now united in opposition to Saddamâs regime.
The Peshmerga under General Mustafaâs command were only too glad to join the Special Forces in the efforts to oust the dictator who had wreaked such harm upon them. As one 10th Group operator recalled: âGeneral Mustafa ran the whole sector, so we co-located with [him]. That way we could basically do a combined campaign with the Kurds. [Mustafa] set us up, and had no problem giving us whatever support we needed.â
General Mustafa was a quiet, soft-spoken man, and when the Green Berets first linked up with him, some were unsure if he was the right guy. But they soon learned that behind Mustafaâs soft-spoken demeanor stood thousands of battle-hardened fighters who would fight and die for him and for the Green Berets of TF VIKING.
General Mustafa had been an Iraqi POW for six years and had no fond feelings toward Saddam and his regime. According to the SF operators who dealt with him, Mustafa was a very scrupulous and honorable man. And the Special Operators on the ground made it clear that the Kurds were a great and invaluable asset. When the Green Berets asked for their support, the Kurds would show up, almost always without hesitation and with little in the way of negotiationsâready and willing.
By dinnertime (1800) on March 23, the ODAs were already in place with their new Pesh allies on the hilltops of northern Iraq. One such A-Team, ODA 056, linked up with the Peshmerga on a hilltop OP (Observation Post) named âHill 725.â ODA 056âs team leader (a captain), its assistant detachment commander (a warrant officer), and team sergeant (a master sergeant) conducted a leaderâs recon to determine their plan of attack. Because of the extremely muddy terrain on the hill, the rest of the ODA turned their SUVs around and headed back to Duhok.
During the night, a nearby Peshmerga checkpoint was hit with two incoming Iraqi artillery rounds, but it was already clear that the Coalition was attacking in full force: Mosul, the northern Iraqi stronghold, was lit up by American bombing runs that were clearly visible in the distance to the west, to the A-Teams in Duhok.
At 0500, the next morning, March 24, the Special Operators of Task Force VIKING began calling in CAS (close air support) on Iraqi positions near the Peshmergaâs defensive lines, from the top of Hill 725. It took a great deal of convincing to get General Mustafa to understand the magnitude of the technology and firepower that the Special Forces could wield in the form of CAS and man-portable Javelin Weapons Systems.
At first, General Mustafa and his staff thought that with just a few handfuls of Green Berets the Iraqi armor units would just roll right over them if they tried to mount an offensive. But soon, General Mustafa had his first taste of U.S. firepower in action. In the Irbil sector, the 2nd BN 10th SFG called in two American F/A-18 Hornets. Their mission was to clear the ridgeline overlooking the Northwest Irbil Airfield to allow the unimpeded flow of military and humanitarian aid. The F/A-18s dropped two five-hundred-pound bombs on the enemy positions, killing eight Iraqis and wounding sixteen.
Later in the day, in the eastern sector, ODA 056 spotted enemy troop movements and positions to the north of the town of Ayn Sifni from their hilltop OP. But by that time, winds were gusting fiercely between 15 and 30 knots, and the