organization. As a result it would become
impossible to do anything useful for the Al ies in future. We therefore ask
that you issue instructions through Silver A for the assassination to be
cancel ed. Delay might prove dangerous. Send instructions immediately.
Should an assassination nevertheless be desirable for considerations of
foreign policy, let it be directed against someone else.26
Two days later, Beneš’s chief of intel igence, František Moravec,
responded with a misleading message: ‘Don’t worry when it comes to
terrorist actions. We believe we see the situation clearly, therefore, given the
situation, any actions against officials of the German Reich do not come
into consideration. Let ÚVOD know . . .’ The fol owing day, on 15 May,
Beneš himself sent a message to the underground without even mentioning
the assassination plan:
I expect that in the forthcoming offensive the Germans will push with
their forces. They are sure to have some success . . . In such a case I would
expect German proposals for an inconclusive peace. The crisis would
be a serious one [for us] . . . In such a situation, an act of violence such
as disturbances, direct subversion, sabotage, or demonstrations, might be
imperative or even necessary in our country. This would save the nation
internationally, and even great sacrifices would be worth it.27
Beneš had once again succumbed to pressure from the British govern-
ment. As intelligence analysts in London pointed out, ‘recent telegrams
from Silver A indicate that the Czech people are relying more and
more on the Russians . . .’ – a development that posed a serious threat to
British long-term interests in Central Europe. The democratic Czech
underground, the report concluded, was simply not pulling its weight and
was surely ‘capable of making far greater efforts . . .’. It now appeared
‘essential, both from the military and political point of view, to take
drastic action to revive confidence in the British war effort, and particu-
larly in S.O.E., if we are to maintain the initiative in directing subsequent
operations’.28
Gabčík and Kubiš, despite final pleas from their underground protec-
tors to abandon the mission, decided that it was time to act. As soldiers,
they felt that they were in no position to question orders that had been
given to them directly by Beneš. When a Czech informer from within
Prague Castle leaked to the resistance Heydrich’s travel plans for a
meeting with Hitler on 27 May, suggesting that the Reich Protector
10
HITLER’S HANGMAN
would then be out of the country for several weeks, Gabčík and Kubiš
decided that this was the date on which to carry out the assassination.29
On the morning of 27 May, while Heydrich was still playing with his
children in his country estate, they accordingly positioned themselves near
the hairpin curve designated for the attack. Despite the warm weather,
Gabčík carried a raincoat over his arm, concealing his sub-machine gun.
On the opposite side of the street, Kubiš was leaning against a lamp post,
two highly sensitive fused bombs in his briefcase. A third man, Josef
Valčík, who had been parachuted into the Protectorate in December as a
member of team Silver A, positioned himself further up the hill where he
acted as lookout for the approaching car. At around 10.20 a.m., Valčík’s
shaving mirror flashed in the sun, signalling that Heydrich’s car was
approaching.30
As the assassins had anticipated, Heydrich’s driver slowed down for the
bend. When the car turned the corner, Gabčík leaped out, aiming his
machine gun at Heydrich and pulling the trigger, but the gun, previously
dismantled and concealed in his briefcase under a layer of grass, jammed.
Heydrich, assuming that there was only one assassin, hastily ordered his
driver to stop the car and drew his pistol, determined to shoot Gabčík – a
fatal error of judgement that would cost him