belonged
to the wider Czech resistance circle were unnecessarily compromised by
the careless use of safe houses and borrowed bicycles, articles of clothing
and briefcases that would subsequently lead the Gestapo to their helpers
and ultimately wipe out all organized resistance in the Protectorate. For
the time being, however, Gabčík and Kubiš were lucky enough not to be
discovered.
Others were less fortunate. The five parachutists of groups Silver A and
Silver B, who had been airdropped only minutes after Gabčik and Kubiš
on the night of 28 December, split up shortly after landing. Many of them
were either arrested by the Gestapo or turned themselves in when they felt
that their families were endangered. Only the group leader of Silver A,
8
HITLER’S HANGMAN
Alfréd Bartoš, managed to re-establish contact with one of the few
surviving commanders of ÚVOD, Captain Václav Morávek, and to install
a radio transmitter, codenamed Libuše, which soon began beaming infor-
mation on industrial production and the population’s mood back to
London. His reports, however, confirmed that resistance activities in the
Protectorate had become ‘exceptionally difficult’, if not impossible, because
‘for everyone politically active, there is a permanent Gestapo agent’.22
If another of the reasons for sending agents into the Protectorate was to
facilitate the bombing of vital arms-production plants, this, too, had limited
success. A plan to co-ordinate a British air raid on the Škoda works in
Pilsen with the aid of the Libuše transmitter faltered. Other missions,
including Silver B, failed completely. Between December 1941 and the
end of May 1942, sixteen other parachutists from England were dropped
over the Protectorate, but none of them completed his mission: two
were arrested by police; two placed themselves voluntarily at the Gestapo’s
disposal in order to avoid imprisonment or torture; and some were shot or
committed suicide when chased by the German police. Others simply
abandoned their missions and returned home to their families. Surprised
by the pervasiveness of the Nazi police state and holding poor-quality
false documents, many simply panicked. In one case, a parachutist sent
word to his mother that he was alive and wel . The excited mother told an
acquaintance, who promptly reported the news to the Gestapo. The para-
chutist’s father and two brothers were held as hostages and threatened with
execution until the parachutist turned himself in.23
In May Bartoš demanded that the parachute drops be halted altogether.
‘You are sending us people for whom we have no use,’ he told London.
‘They are a burden on the organizational network which is undesirable in
today’s critical times. The Czech and German security authorities have so
much information and knowledge about us that to repeat these operations
would be a waste of people and equipment.’24 But SOE and Beneš pressed
on. Before long, to his horror, Bartoš found out about the purpose of the
mission entrusted to Gabčík and Kubiš.25 Twice in early May, ÚVOD
broadcast desperate messages to Beneš entreating him to abandon the
assassination, arguing that German reprisals for the killing of Heydrich
were likely to wipe out whatever was left of the Czech underground:
Judging by the preparations which Ota and Zdenek [the codenames of
Gabčík and Kubiš] are making, and by the place where they are making
these preparations, we assume, in spite of the silence they are maintaining,
that they are planning to assassinate ‘H’. This assassination would in no
way benefit the Al ies, and might have incalculable consequences for our
nation. It would not only endanger our hostages and political prisoners,
D E AT H I N P R AG U E
9
but also cost thousands of other lives. It would expose the nation to
unparal eled consequences, while at the same time sweeping away the last
remnants of [underground]