on the weather.
* * * * *
The morning of the 9th was fine, but by noon a fresh and unseasonable northwest wind sprang up. During the afternoon the wind increased, and by evening there was a heavy swell, which would make landings hazardous, particularly on the western beaches in the American sector. The landing-craft convoys, plunging northward from Malta and from many African ports between Bizerta and Benghazi, were having a rough voyage.
Arrangements had been made for postponing the landing in case of necessity, but a decision would have to be taken not later than noon. Watching anxiously from the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord inquired by signal about the weather conditions. Admiral Cunningham replied at 8 P.M. , “Weather not favourable, but operation proceeding.” “It was,” he says, “manifestly too late for postponement, but considerable anxiety was felt, particularly for the small-craft convoys making up against the sea.” They were indeed much delayed and became scattered. Many ships arrived late, but fortunately no great harm resulted. “The wind,” says Cunningham, “mercifully eased during the night, and by the morning of the 10th had ceased, leaving only a tiresome swell and surf on the western beaches.”
The bad weather helped to give us surprise. Admiral Cunningham continues:
The very efficient cover plan and the deceptive routeing of convoys played their part. In addition the vigilance of the enemy was undoubtedly relaxed owing to the unfavourable phase of the moon. Finally came this wind, dangerously close at the time to making some, if not all, the landings impracticable. These apparently unfavourable factors had actually the effect of making the weary Italians, who had been alert for many nights, turn thankfully in their beds, saying, “Tonight at any rate they can’t come.” B UT THEY CAME .
The airborne forces however met hard fortune. More than one-third of the gliders carrying our 1st Air Landing Brigade were released too early by their American towing aircraft and many of the men they carried were drowned. The rest werescattered over southeastern Sicily, and only twelve gliders arrived at the important bridge which was their aim. Out of eight officers and sixty-five men who seized and held it until help came twelve hours later, only nineteen survived unwounded. This was a forlorn feat of arms. On the American front the air landings were also too widely dispersed, but the many small parties creating damage and confusion inland worried the Italian coastal divisions.
The seaborne landings, under continuous fighter protection, were everywhere highly successful. Syracuse and Pachino on the British front, Licata and Gela on the American, were captured. The Eighth Army took Augusta on the 12th. On the American front very heavy counter-attacks were made on the United States 1st Division by part of a German armoured division. For a time the position was critical, but after a stiff fight the enemy were beaten off and our Allies pressed on to capture the important airfields east of Gela.
The major effort of the Eighth Army was now directed against the airfields at Catania and Gerbini. Aided by more airborne and seaborne landings of parachute and Commando troops, which captured vital bridges, the army crossed the river Simeto. But now German troops from farther west reinforced the Italians and progress beyond the river was stopped. On the 16th, the left flank of the Eighth Army reached Caltagirone, in close touch with the Americans, who were also pressing westward along the coast and had taken Porto Empedocle.
Twelve airfields were now in our hands, and by July 18 there were only twenty-five serviceable German aircraft in the island. Eleven hundred planes, more than half of them German, were left behind destroyed or damaged. Our air forces tried hard to stop the passage of troops from the mainland to Messina. They were only partly successful against the heavy anti-aircraft