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fire.
    On July 16, General Alexander ordered the Eighth Army to attack the western side of Mount Etna, and the Seventh Army to seize the roads around Enna and cut the west-east highway at Petralia. The 50th Division could make little progress, andthe Germans had brought reinforcements, including six battalions of the redoubtable 1st Parachute Division, from the mainland. On its left we made some ground, but it was clear that a new plan and more troops were needed. There was a lull on the British front till the 78th Division arrived from Tunisia.
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    Our next strategic move was still in suspense. Should we cross the Straits of Messina and seize the toe of Italy, should we seize the heel at Taranto, or should we land higher up the west coast, in the Gulf of Salerno, and capture Naples? Or, again, must we restrict ourselves to the occupation of Sardinia? In June, General Eisenhower had been asked for his opinion. The problem was a difficult one. At the Washington Conference in May (“Trident”), we had decided to transfer to India about August much of the assault shipping and certain air forces then allotted to the Sicily attack. He had also been warned that after November 1 four American and three British divisions would have to be withdrawn to Britain for the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. On June 30, he proposed that when the capture of Sicily had been completed, we should attack either the toe of Italy, or Sardinia. If Sardinia were chosen, he could probably be ready by October, but he did not expect to be able to invade the mainland of Italy before November, and by then the weather might be too bad for amphibious landings. To justify so late a descent upon Italy there had to be a good prospect of a speedy advance.
    The progress made in Sicily clarified the scene. The contrast may be judged from the telegram in which I set the whole position before Smuts on July 16:
    Prime Minister to General Smuts
    16 July 43
    In our May talks at Washington we found serious American misgivings lest we should become deeply involved in the Mediterranean, and a hankering for winding up the campaign there with the capture of Sardinia. This we combated, and, as our forces in the Mediterranean far outnumber the American, we were able tohave the matter left open till after the capture of Sicily. Not being satisfied with this, I requested the President to send General Marshall with me to North Africa and there upon the spot to convince Eisenhower and others that nothing less than Rome could satisfy the requirements of this year’s campaign. We agreed that the decision should be taken when it was seen how the fighting in Sicily went. If it was severe and prolonged, then only Sardinia might be possible. If however our enterprise prospered and Italian resistance was seen not to be formidable, then we were immediately to invade the Italian mainland.
    2. The moment is now approaching when this choice must be made, and I need not tell you I shall make it a capital issue. I believe the President is with me; Eisenhower in his heart is naturally for it. I will in no circumstances allow the powerful British and British-controlled armies in the Mediterranean to stand idle. I am bringing the very fine Polish army from Persia into Syria, where it can also participate.
    3. The situation in the Balkans is also most hopeful, and I am sending you a report from the Middle East Headquarters showing the Italian forces on the verge of collapse. Not only must we take Rome and march as far north as possible in Italy, but our right hand must give succour to the Balkan patriots. In all this there is great hope, provided action is taken worthy of the opportunity. I am confident of a good result, and I shall go all lengths to procure the agreement of our Allies. If not, we have ample forces to act by ourselves.
    4. When are you coming over here? You know what a warm welcome awaits you and how close is our community of ideas on war. All the above is