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the lowest point in its fortunes, the ARVN was losing a battalion of soldiers and a district capital a week. President Lyndon Johnson decided to alter radically the degree of America’s commitment to stopping Communism in Southeast Asia. Following the Tonkin resolution, Congress authorized him—without a declaration of war—both to bomb North Vietnam and to send troops to the South; Congress did not foresee millions of GIs would serve in Vietnam, and that the war would drag on for ten more years.
    In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong had established huge enclaves that they alone governed. Some, like those on the Cambodian border, would remain inviolate sanctuaries for much of the war. But the NLF’s aim was not just to carve out areas of rural hegemony; it was to fulfill Ho Chi Minh’s promise of reunification and independence which they felt had been denied them by the cancellation of the 1956 elections. The Viet Cong’s most critical forward bases would be those nearest to Saigon, in Cu Chi and Ben Cat districts, fearsome Viet Cong strongholds that the ARVN dared not enter. When General Westmoreland assessed the situation and decided upon the tactic of search-and-destroy, it was upon Cu Chi, the Iron Triangle, the woods of Tay Ninh and their giant tunnel and bunker complexes that the full sophistication of American military might would be unleashed.
    The first sizable American units to reach Vietnam werethe marines. Their initial task was to defend coastal enclaves and airstrips. Large units of the army soon followed and halted the downhill slide caused by the collapsing ARVN. In mid-1965, General Giap tried to cut South Vietnam in two along a line from Pleiku in the central highlands to the coast. This threat was averted in October by the bloody confrontation in the Ia Drang valley between three North Vietnamese regiments and the 1st Air Cavalry Division, helicoptered into battle. This event established the pattern that would be one of General Westmoreland’s proudest boasts, that the United States Army never lost a battle in Vietnam. Faced with such overwhelming firepower, including air support, the Communists were obliged to fight a different sort of war—harrying their enemies at times and places of their own choosing and otherwise avoiding contact by concealment. Only when the Americans had left Vietnam did the Communists again wage a conventional war of movement—eventually with success.
    By the end of 1965, the ground war in South Vietnam was the main focus of American strategy. The bombing of North Vietnam was having little effect, nor was diplomatic pressure on Hanoi. The policy of nation-building, developing schemes such as irrigation, to ingratiate the Saigon regime with the peasants, could not undo historic xenophobic attitudes. The only place where America could be seen to be succeeding was in killing the Viet Cong by the use of its unmatched military technology and the size of its units. A war of attrition was the result, one that measured its success by counting the enemy dead.
    General Westmoreland, who had headed American Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, since 1964, saw numbers as the solution to the deteriorating situation in the South. American commitment grew throughout 1965, and whole divisions of over 20,000 men each found themselves crossing the Pacific. Westmoreland’s first concern was to protect Saigon; his second to “pacify” the countryside. He decided, therefore, to ring Saigon with huge base camps that would, in time, become almost permanent in character. The sites chosen were, not surprisingly, close to areas of Viet Cong domination and intense activity. At Di An, south of the Iron Triangle, would be the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division, the “Big Red One.” The Hawaii-based 25th (Tropic Lightning) Division would bebased beside Cu Chi town. And there were many others. Before establishing these camps, there had to be sweep