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senators and congressmen directing specificamounts of money to specific projects in their states or congressional districts.
    “And when I’m president, I will go line by line to make sure that we are not spending money unwisely.”
    Less than a month after he signed the stimulus bill into law, Obama was staring at a massive appropriations bill that had passed Congress and was awaiting his signature.
    Reid wanted the president to sign it, but the bill had 8,570 earmarks adding up to $7.7 billion in spending, much of it on easily ridiculed hometown pork and pet projects.
    The president balked. He wanted to take a stand.
    Republican leaders in Congress were howling for a veto and claimed anything less would be a violation of Obama’s campaign promise.
    House Minority Leader John Boehner’s spokesman reminded reporters, “The president has made some very specific promises when it comes to earmarks, and in order to keep them he is going to have to stand up to Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill.”
    Reid was incensed. Members saw that spending as key to serving the needs of their constituents, and Congress actually had reduced the number of earmarks compared to previous years. Politically, a veto of the bill would blow up months of painful negotiations, opening previously settled issues to another round of debate.
    In a meeting with Obama, Reid said, Look, this is our prerogative. I understand you don’t like earmarks, but they serve an important purpose, and if you get rid of them all, you’re not going to get anything else done.
    Reid’s threat left the president tense and frustrated. In public, he tried to make the best of it.
    He signed the bill, in private, on March 11, 2009. At the same time, he issued a statement proposing increased safeguards against abuse in the future. 11
    Republicans hammered him for breaking his word. And the president’s erstwhile allies, congressional Democrats, fumed over what they saw as White House overreach.
    House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, a Maryland Democrat, all butdared Obama to try reforming the process, telling the press, “I don’t think the White House has the ability to tell us what to do.” 12
    For the Obama true believers, those who saw him as a reformer, it was, perhaps, the first hint of disillusionment. He had promised things would be different.
    To those members of the administration new to the executive branch, it was an early indication that the inside game of governing was very different from the outside game of campaigning.
    • • •
    On Tuesday, November 24, 2009, just before Thanksgiving, Senator Kent Conrad headed down Pennsylvania Avenue for a private meeting at the White House with his former colleague, now the president. It was another step in a career-long effort of what could be called “The Project,” or “The Mission.” Conrad, the head of the Senate Budget Committee, believed the country was heading off a fiscal cliff. He could prove it, and he was going to fix it.
    His intense, scholarly look inspired one Senate colleague to refer to him as “The Auditor.” But the 61-year-old North Dakotan also had an honorary tribal name given by the Sioux Indians in his home state: It translated as “Never-Turns-Back.” 13
    From his five years as state tax commissioner to his 23 years in the Senate, Conrad was the quintessential fiscal hawk. He had been the second senator to endorse Obama for president, and the two had a friendly, though not close, relationship.
    In the Oval Office with Obama and his economic troika, Geithner, Summers and Orszag, Conrad warned that federal debt and spending posed a long-term threat, more now than ever. The country’s present course was not sustainable. And that’s not just my view, he said. It’s the view of your budget director, Orszag. It’s the view of the head of the Congressional Budget Office. It’s the view of the Federal Reserve.
    “Kent,” Obama said, “I’ve seen your charts.”
    Everyone laughed.