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anti-globalization movement and division over the military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the 1998 air strikes against Iraq. They only became more severe and divisive in the post 9/11 years.
    Such tumult reflected the pain of the contested 2000 and 2004 election losses and deep anger with George W. Bush. But it was more than that. When it came to national security issues, liberals had become divided in a way not seen since the 1970s, when Vietnam had split the Democratic Party and sparked a reaction, pitting the “new Left” against the liberal establishment. A similar dynamic unfolded in the 2000s, as a new generation of internet-fueled liberal activists (call it the “new-new-Left”) raged not just against Bush, but against the Democratic establishment in Washington. 12 At the forefront of this were groups like MoveOn.org , which pressed relentlessly for theDemocratic Party to take a stronger stance against the Iraq War. When combined with a conservative movement that was itself splintering and a media culture that was becoming more partisan, instant, and atomized, the result was a more embittered and chaotic policymaking environment.
    These internecine battles got ugly. Nothing demonstrated that more vividly than the fate of Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman. A respected Democratic senator for eighteen years, and Al Gore’s vice-presidential running mate in 2000, Lieberman was a foreign policy hawk, who had advocated for intervention in the Balkans and getting tough on Iraq. Lieberman was just a few Florida votes away from being vice president of the United States, and ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004. Yet by 2007, Lieberman had become a pariah among the “new-new-Left.” He lost a primary election to an antiwar candidate who was bolstered by outside money, and returned to the Senate as an Independent. In 2008, he endorsed and actively campaigned for John McCain for president against Obama. 13
    This political fratricide sent shockwaves among Democratic foreign policy elites. To the extent that Clinton’s presidency had exorcised the ghosts of McGovern—allowing progressives to be comfortable with American leadership, power, and intervention—the new debate seemed to reopen old wounds.
    B ARACK O BAMA ’ S VOCAL stance against the Iraq War gave him legitimacy among this new cadre of liberal activists and donors. But he was not some bleeding heart. Obama made clear he was not against all wars, only “dumb ones.” He argued that while the top concerns of many of these liberals (like withdrawing from Iraq or fighting AIDS) had merit, “they hardly constitute a coherent national security policy…like it or not, if we want to make America more secure, we are going to have to help make the world more secure.” 14
    Moreover, Obama relied a great deal on those Democratic thinkers and ideas that were the product of the efforts to get stronger on national security after the 2004 election. So, in a way, Obama embodied the hopes and ambitions of both sides. He also embodied their contradictions.
    WHAT DOES “STRENGTH” MEAN?
    While Obama campaigned for the presidency by positioning himself against the professional foreign policy elite, his approach to foreign policy reflected the views of mainstream progressives, especially as they contrasted with conservatives. Obama might have vigorously campaigned against Hillary Clinton, but in fundamental ways, he embraced the consensus that mainstream Democrats had rallied around after her husband left office.
    Many of the policies that progressive foreign policy thinkers had championed and developed in the 2000s—responsibly managing the transitions out of Iraq and Afghanistan; bringing new focus to the war against al-Qaeda; maintaining military strength and willingness to use force while achieving greater balance between defense, diplomacy, and development; revitalizing core alliances,