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him. As the Mooltan sailed from Marseilles to London he wrote a letter to his own prime minister in Melbourne. Murdoch had not collaborated with Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett in writing their letters on Imbros but there is little doubt that the outlook of the two men was essentially the same. Murdoch’s was not a formal report to Fisher, rather it was a personal letter to a prime minister who was also his friend. Murdoch had finished a first draft of the letter by the time he reached London. Over the next couple of days he polished it, either in the offices of the Australian High Commissioner or in his own office, and had it cabled to Melbourne.
    Andrew Fisher was by now a sick man, exhausted by the worry and anxiety of the war. He would resign as prime minister on 27 October 1915 to become Australian High Commissioner in London. From Melbourne there was not much Fisher could do to influence events at Gallipoli but the letter alarmed him and added to his anxiety. In October Asquith cabled to Fisher warning him not to place too much faith in Murdoch’s letter. He also promised to release to the Australian prime minister documents relating to the Gallipoli campaign. Murdoch’s letter had already worked for Australia—there would now be some sort of flow of information.
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    On his visit to London six years earlier Murdoch had been unknown. Now he returned as one of Australia’s most prominent journalists. The United Cable Service, which he would head, had its offices in the Times building in London and, as a matter of course, Murdoch was introduced to the editor of the Times , Geoffrey Dawson, a man in a position of such influence that he probably outranked most cabinet ministers in importance. The two men lunched together and Murdoch gave Dawson a full account of his views about the campaign, the need for Hamilton’s recall and the necessity of the evacuation of all the troops. The editor was appalled by what he heard, disbelieving to an extent, but horrified to hear that the campaign could not succeed. Dawson subsequently arranged interviews between Murdoch and some British politicians.
    Murdoch first met Sir Edward Carson, chairman of the British Cabinet’s Dardanelles Committee. The committee had responsibility for every aspect of the campaign and it needed to know what was actually happening out there, not merely what General Hamilton reported. Carson listened intently—he had been a strong supporter of the campaign at the Dardanelles. He in turn arranged for Murdoch to meet David Lloyd George, Minister for Munitions, and increasingly a sceptic about the Gallipoli adventure. Murdoch must have been persuasive because these men had originally believed in the second front. Perhaps he confused them as much as he convinced them, but out of this confusion action would finally come.
    When urged by his ministers, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, read what Murdoch had written to Fisher and was alarmed. Could this be true, he wondered? If so, hard decisions would have to be made. Apparently without consultation Asquith had Murdoch’s letter printed as a paper to the Committee of Imperial Defence, immediately giving it much greater authority and significance and much wider circulation than first intended. Murdoch had cracked the facade of confidence that had enclosed the Gallipoli campaign. The Dardanelles Committee, the Cabinet, had to act.
    In the course of the next few weeks Hamilton was replaced at Gallipoli by General Sir Charles Monro, who had little faith in the Dardanelles adventure. Lord Kitchener was despatched to Gallipoli to see the situation for himself and to report back, after which a decision was made to evacuate the troops from Anzac and Suvla and subsequently from Helles. The Dardanelles campaign would come to an end. The Murdoch letter played a crucial role in all of these events.
    The letter
    In his official history, Charles Bean described Keith Murdoch as ‘a man of forceful