support behind the front line than to spread out your soldiers so that you can make the front line more imposing.
He who knows his forces and those of the enemy will be hard to vanquish.
The soldiers’ skill is worth more than their number, and the site of a battle can sometimes be of greater benefit than skill.
What is new and unexpected will take an army aback, while the army looks down on what is customary and predictable. You will therefore give your army both practice and knowledge of a new enemy by engaging him in minor skirmishes before you face him in battle.
Whoever pursues a routed enemy in a disorderly manner is seeking to become a defeated victor.
Whoever does not prepare his provisions will be defeated without steel.
Whoever places more trust in cavalry than in infantry, or more in infantry than in cavalry, must accommodate himself to the site of battle.
If you want to ascertain whether a spy has entered your camp, have all men in the middle of the day return to their assigned quarters.
Change your battle plan when you see that your enemy has predicted it.
Seek the counsel of many on what you should do, but then confer with only a few on what you will do.
Soldiers are kept in their quarters by fear and punishment; when they are marched into battle, they are led by hope and reward.
Good generals never engage in battle unless necessity compels or opportunity beckons.
Make sure that your enemy does not know how you plan to order your ranks in battle, and in whatever way you order them, be certain that the first line can be absorbed by the second and third.
Never use a division in battle for another purpose than the one to which you assigned it, unless you want to cause disorder.
Sudden upsets are countered with difficulty, unless one can think on one’s feet.
Men, steel, money, and bread are the backbone of war; but of these four the first two are more necessary, because men and steel can find money and bread, but money and bread cannot find men and steel.
The unarmed rich man is the prize of the poor soldier.
Accustom your soldiers to despise comfortable living and luxurious attire.
All this is what has generally occurred to me, though I know I could have told you many more things in our discussion: for example, in how many different ways the ancients organized their ranks, how they dressed, how they trained, and many other things. I could have brought up many other particulars, which I did not, however, judge necessary because you can read about them quite readily, and also because my intention was not to show exactly how the ancient army was created, but how an army should be organized in our times so that it might have more skill and ability than it does. Hence I felt it unnecessary to discuss ancient matters in greater depth beyond what I felt necessary as an introduction.
23. In the following, Machiavelli translates, adapts, and paraphrases maxims from De re militari by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (fourth century CE ), a work that advocates and codifies the arrangement of armies according to a classical Roman ideal. Machiavelli expands and adapts Vegetius’s Latin maxims and adds a few of his own.
Selections from
F LORENTINE H ISTORIES
Machiavelli’s final major work was written in the last few years of his life. In 1520, after eight years of exclusion from politics and living in impoverishment on his farm, Machiavelli was offered the post of historiographer of Florence by Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, who in 1523 was to become Pope Clement VII The contract Giulio de’ Medici offered Machiavelli specified that it would be left up to Machiavelli to choose whether this work —“annalia et cronacas fiorentinas”— would be written in Latin or the “Tuscan tongue.” Machiavelli chose the elegant and modern Tuscan Italian in which he had written The Prince, The Discourses, and his graceful works of prose and poetry .
In Florentine Histories, Machiavelli, who for much of his life had