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management level with the qualities to achieve that.’ He heard me out and responded, ‘ Tell me which of the qualities you have outlined you don’t possess. I have you in mind for the post.’
    I had joined Air India as its chief public relations manager and had not expected that my assignment would change and that too, so soon. I asked for some time to think and consulted with a few colleagues. However, most of my peers said that I should refuse, as it was a thankless job. They were comfortable maintaining the status quo and loathe to taking up any challenge or increasing the scope of their responsibilities and wanted me to do the same. After a month, prodded by Mr Deveshwar, I disregarded their warnings and took up the offer. I saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate that if one had the will, one could not only arrest the decline in service standards but, in fact, improve them.
    From July 1992, I spent six months as an ‘understudy’ to the head of the In-flight Services Department. This was a first in the history of Air India. The general practice was to move people to other departments without any training or guidance on the day the previous head of the department was due to retire. I moved to the department’s office at Sahar, Mumbai, to familiarise myself with its strengths and weaknesses, while concurrently holding my position as the head of the Public Relations Department. My first few months were spent listening to the experiences recounted by the management team and members of the cabin crew. I wanted to get to know the strengths and weaknesses of the department, and spoke to people who had served for close to 30 years with the airline, as well as those who were relatively new. Time and again, my talks with various people in the organisation threw up the same refrain: ‘We were known for immaculate in-flight service and this has been destroyed.’ ‘What was the problem?’ I asked. They replied that everyone was at fault. The management team said the unions were responsible for the state of affairs. Crew members blamed the management. And the more I spoke to people, the clearer it became: a combination of factors had led to the dilution of the airline’s in-flight service standards.
    The courts had changed the retirement age of air hostesses, allowing them to work after becoming mothers. While there is nothing wrong with mothers being a part of the crew, as is the case in many international airlines, the problem was with ensuring that the physical standards mandatory for hostesses were adhered to by everyone. Air India lacked the authority to impose discipline as some other airlines, such as some Southeast Asian airlines, were known to do in similar circumstances and it was commonly seen that air hostesses became lax about their appearance as they advanced in years and especially after they came back from their maternity leaves. While the court order had given air hostesses the right to continue work post-motherhood, the hostesses had not been responsible enough and the airline not firm enough to ensure that the standards of weight, grooming and performance were met. In the end, passengers suffered and Air India lost out. The management had also been lax with the selection of the cabin crew, whereby people who had neither the qualifications nor the exposure or aptitude for the job were inducted. The department had allowed external interference in the selection, and more importantly, allowed unions to enjoy a veto right on any changes that the management wanted to introduce to enhance the product.
    Indiscipline at every level had ruined the department. The employees I spoke with also pointed out the disturbing rise in in-flight pilferage and the management’s inability to check this. Senior members of the in-flight team cited instances of crew members being poorly groomed and overweight. With so many dilutions, the decline in Air India’s service standards was only to be expected.
    The time I spent as