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dispersed disposition had been forced on the armies by the need for supply and billeting, but it meant that the two forces would be slow to concentrate in an emergency.
    Third, both Wellington and Blücher had very good cause to be worried about the flanks of their positions, but for opposite reasons. Wellington was supplied from Britain with supplies coming through the Channel ports, principally Antwerp, that lay behind his right flank. A French attack that went to the west around his right flank would cut him off not only from sources of supply but also from any possible line of retreat. Wellington would correctly identify this as being the key weakness of his position.
    Blücher, on the other hand, drew his supplies from the east, though Liège and Aachen. In that direction, also, lay his lines of retreat back to Prussia. He would be as worried about his left or eastern flank as Wellington was about his right or western flank. Napoleon could not be certain, but he guessed that neither Wellington nor Blücher could be comfortable where they were: both knew their supply lines and lines of retreat were open to threat if Napoleon made a sudden move.
    Even more tempting were the political opportunities. Until only a year before, the area now known as Belgium had been part of France. The allies had taken it away and given it to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The people of the area were French-speaking and, generally, favoured the reforms of the Revolution. If Napoleon managed to drive the allies out of the area – or even just march into the largest city, Brussels, amidst popular rejoicing – it would send political shockwaves across Europe, stirring up revolutionaries and causing the more reactionary rulers to pull their troops home to secure their thrones.
    Just as critical were the respective strengths of the two Allied armies. Together they outnumbered Napoleon’s forces, but separately they were each outnumbered by Napoleon. If Napoleon could separate Blücher and Wellington then attack each in turn, he could bring his temporary superior strength to bear and defeat them both. Napoleon knew that Blücher preferred to attack, while Wellington preferred to defend – and he planned his strategy accordingly.
     
    Attack in the Netherlands
     
    The opportunity for which Napoleon was looking came in the first week of June when the disposition of the Allied armies shifted somewhat. Wellington moved his left-wing units back towards Brussels, while at the same time Blücher moved his right-wing units slightly towards Namur. This opened up a small gap between the two armies. In itself this might not have been crucial, but the gap was at the town of Charleroi, a key position where many roads met and where there were good bridges over the river Sambre.
    If Napoleon grabbed Charleroi he would have put his army between those of Wellington and Blücher. He could, therefore, attack whichever one he wanted to destroy first before the other had a realistic chance of concentrating its forces from its dispersed billets and getting into action. Knowing that Blücher was more likely to attack aggressively than was Wellington, Napoleon decided to destroy the Prussian army first.
    Having decided to fight the decisive battle in the Netherlands, Napoleon had to arrange his own deployments. In this he was aided by Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout, arguably the finest French commander of the period – after Napoleon himself.
    When Davout took up his position as minister of war a few days after Napoleon’s return he had no idea where the decisive battle might be fought, but guessed it would be either on the Rhine or in the Netherlands.
    It had been the French who had first developed the corps system, and Davout now organized Napoleon’s growing army into 12 corps, together with a cavalry reserve and the Imperial Guard. Each corps was a complete army in miniature composed of infantry, cavalry and artillery with its own supply system, staff and command