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early claims came from the London-based publication Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor , which reported that Shabaab had provided the pirates with funds, bases, and “specialist weapons” in exchange for a share of the ransoms as well as pirate training in “naval tactics.” 3 The image of turbaned Islamists instructing pirates in sharpshooting in return for sailing lessons would be laughable if it did not have such serious implications for the safety of hostages; a Shabaab-piracy connection would effectively prevent the paying of ransoms, since in most Western countries it is illegal under any circumstances to transfer funds to a designated terrorist organization.
    History, at least, seems to be against those who would claim an Islamist-pirate conspiracy. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union began pushing north, reaching Harardheere in August. Dubbing piracy un-Islamic, or haram , ICU militias shut down operations in Harardheere, forcing many pirates into Puntland (as mentioned in Chapter 2 , the ICU clamp-down in Harardheere partly accounted for the rise of Eyl as Somalia’s piracy capital). Despite the potential loss of revenue, evincing such an attitude—at least publicly—was necessary for the ICU to maintain the legitimacy of its fundamentalist ideology. It was able to afford its pious airs; the group reportedly receives substantial funding from affluent supporters in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.
    During my months in Puntland, I questioned every pirate I met about Islamist ties, and received the same vehement denials from every one. Nonetheless, some indications of a relationship between Al-Shabaab and the pirates had emerged by late 2009, or so said my source in the Somali diplomatic community. On October 2, the Spanish tuna boat Alakrana was seized by one of Afweyne’s attack groups and brought to Harardheere (the thirty-six hostages were released seven weeks later for a reported ransom of $4.5 million). Before arriving in Harardheere, however, the pirates stopped at the Shabaab-controlled port of Baraawe, where two hijackers headed for shore in a small skiff. They had hardly left the ship before a Spanish navy helicopter intercepted and arrested them.
    “They were supposed to meet the Shabaab leaders in Baraawe and bring them to Harardheere,” my source explained. “As it turned out, the leaders had to make the trip by road.” The incident, he argued, was “ultimate evidence” of a connection between Shabaab and the Harardheere pirates, a relationship that he said had been brokered by Afweyne himself. “Shabaab could be receiving anywhere from 5 per cent to 60 per cent of the ransom,” my source said. “And according to my information, it’s much more than a gentleman’s agreement for money. Al-Shabaab itself seems to be training for acts of piracy—becoming, in effect, ‘sea Mujahedeen.’ ”
    Nevertheless, there was still no evidence, fourteen months later, that any Islamist group had launched a “piracy division.” But this may change; in a repeat of the 2006 ICU clamp-down, Hizbul Islam—the then second most influential Islamist group in Somalia, after Shabaab—invaded Harardheere in May 2010, chasing many of the resident pirates north to the town of Hobyo. Like the ICU, both Hizbul Islam and Shabaab have publicly declared piracy to be haram , but the lure of large sums of money may have spawned a reinterpretation of the scriptures; there are reports that the remaining Harardheere pirates have begun to split their ransoms with both Islamist groups. 4 In the cynical words of my diplomat source, “Nothing is haram if it supports the insurgency.”
    In Hobyo, conversely, the pirates have decided to fight ’em rather than join ’em. Mohamed Garfjani, a Hobyo pirate strongman believed to have hijacked a half-dozen ships, has built up an organized militia consisting of several hundred men, eighty heavy machine guns, and six technicals (flatbed trucks mounted with light