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to stunt the power of more radical Shiite Iraqi figures. The United States feared the Shiite parties and their suspected ties to Iran. The CPA was coming to an end, but the White House wanted to maintain its influence over the Iraqi political process to go along with the massive American military occupation, and Allawi seemed to be its best bet. Hersh wrote that President Bush had secretly authorized a covert action to back Allawi’s campaign, but that once congressional leaders were briefed on the plan, Nancy Pelosi, the California Democrat who was then the House minority leader, objected. Hersh reported that Bush then circumvented Congress and Pelosi’s objections by arranging an operation “that was kept, in part, off the books” to support Allawi. Hersh wrote that the operation “used funds that were not necessarily appropriated by Congress.” If they weren’t using U.S. funds, according to Hersh, then it would be much easier to hide the operation from Congress.
    In the 2005 elections, despite whatever cash assistance he may have had, Allawi’s ties to the Americans damaged his credibility and he was routed, losing to Shiite political leader Nouri al-Maliki. Hersh wrote that there was evidence that Allawi had plenty of money at his disposal during his failed campaign.
    Bremer denied in an interview that the cash flights were accelerated at the last minute to help Allawi. “That’s nonsense,” Bremer said. “We didn’t know as of June or May whether Allawi would even be a candidate in 2005. It had to do with the fact that the government would need $5–6 billion until they could get procedures in place with the Fed.” Bremer further said the flights were accelerated because the Iraqi finance minister wanted to get the funds, because he was concerned that the new Iraqi government would be unfamiliar with the procedures used to arrange the cash flights, and thus the government might have to go without funds as a result.
    â€œThe Iraqi minister of finance contacted us in, I think late May or early June,” Bremer said. “[He was concerned] there might be hesitation on the Iraqi side or the Fed side to transfer funds.”
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    For years, Stuart Bowen and his investigators were frustrated that they could not get any answers about what had happened to the cash. They could trace it from East Rutherford to Andrews Air Force Base, from Andrews to Baghdad International Airport, and from the airport to downtown Baghdad. But they had no idea what happened after that; the records were abysmal. Billions of dollars had simply disappeared into the CPA and the Iraqi government
    That did not mean it had all been stolen. It meant that no one could prove that it hadn’t been, and so Bowen’s office did repeated audits of the cash from the Development Fund of Iraq, and with each new report, complained about the suspicious absence of adequate recordkeeping for so much money.
    Gradually, Bowen’s staff made progress. His office concluded that as much as $1.3 billion from the cash flights had gone into a corrupt deal arranged in 2004 by the Iraqi minister of defense, Hazim al-Sha’alan. The defense minister, working with a key aide, Ziyad Qattan, created a fraudulent defense contract to make it look like the money was being used for equipment purchases to help rebuild the Iraqi Army, Bowen’s office concluded. They fled Iraq but were able to move the money out of the country without being detected. They were tried and convicted in absentia in Iraq on corruption charges.
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    The most explosive investigation Bowen’s office ever conducted began in 2010, when Wael el-Zein, a Lebanese American who was then serving as a special assistant and translator for Bowen, relayed highly sensitive information that led Bowen and his team on a secret mission to find a hidden treasure trove of missing cash and solve one of the biggest mysteries of the Iraq war.
    Wael