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concerns about the threat posed by the spread of jihadi fundamentalism in Pakistan. China may express its annoyance to Pakistan and even share its concerns with India. But Pakistan has always been quick to deliver on China’s concerns and demands. It is over-optimistic to assume that we can cooperate with China in ‘stabilizing’ Pakistan or in dealing with the jihadi threat emanating from it. If anything, as American presence in Afghanistan ebbs and as the Pakistan Army’s ability to assert control over its territory diminishes, we are likely to see an increasing Chinese role in Pakistan. In consequence, we may need to think of Pakistan as a subset of the larger strategic challenges posed by China. We should certainly engage China on this, because it is able to exert some pressure on Pakistan. But we should recognize that this is of tactical value and of limited utility.
    The internal stability of Pakistan—whether it continues in the current unstable equilibrium or moves towardsgreater stability or instability—will be primarily determined by forces at work within Pakistan itself. There is little that India can do either to accelerate or impede a potential implosion of Pakistan. Concerns on this account must not inhibit our strategy towards Pakistan.
    The aim of our Pakistan strategy must be to impart stability to our relationship. This comes down to the pursuit of two broad objectives. First, we need to ensure that no serious terrorist attacks—defined as attacks that could have significant domestic impact—are launched on Indian territory by groups based in Pakistan. Second, we need to create a situation where both sides have sufficient confidence and trust to tackle the more deep-seated and thorny outstanding disputes. Working towards these will require creating and wielding a set of negative and positive levers.
Negative Levers
    The negative levers will aim to convince Pakistan that the pursuit of cross-border terrorism will not only fail to advance its objectives vis-à-vis India but also impose significant costs and risks to Pakistan’s vital interests as perceived by its own elite. The former will require a robust strategy of denial. We need to make it extremely difficultfor any serious terrorist attack to be pulled off on Indian soil. Doing so would mainly require strengthening our police, intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities. Over time, the growing inability of jihadi outfits to carry out such attacks is likely to reduce their attraction and utility to the Pakistan establishment.
    We should also be prepared—in the event of a major terrorist attack—to convey a political signal to the Pakistan Army. The idea would be to instil a measure of caution and make them think hard before allowing another attack in the future. We have, in the past, resorted to controlled application of force across the Line of Control. Going forward, we need to move away from the notion of capturing and holding territory (however limited) to conducting effective stand-off punitive operations. (This is discussed further in Chapter Three .) Given that concerns about escalation cannot be wished away, we also need to develop other capabilities to impose behaviour-altering costs on Pakistan.
    Equally, on the political front we need to develop the ability to put Pakistan diplomatically on the back foot. We should not hesitate to point out Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities. To begin with, we could express public concern over the situation in places like Balochistan and condemn human rights violations there. The level of ourresponse could be gradually and progressively elevated. Our stance will fall well short of action on the ground, but it will gradually provide an effective tool to counter Pakistan’s public posturing on Jammu and Kashmir.
    Similarly, we need to gradually turn the spotlight on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan. Our quest for a Line of Control (LoC)–based solution for Jammu and Kashmir has