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ideological extremism and their pragmatic moderation. Not su*-' prisingly, they succeeded neither in conciliating their rivals nor in eliminating them through revolution.
    The continuing dogmatism and radical rhetoric of the Socialists did manage to pacify the party’s left wing and to prevent the growth of a large Communist party. But the ideological extremism also alienated the bourgeoisie and peasantry. A more flexible policy, like that followed by the Scandinavian Socialists, might very well have broadened the social base of the SDP among groups such as intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, which were sympathetic towards the party in the early postwar years. 31 The breakup of opposition party meetings and rallies was also a perilous precedent that the Nazis were later only too willing to imitate. The elaborate, tight, and almost totalitarian organization of the party likewise found an admirer and follower in none other than Adolf Hitler. 32 And because the Socialists were such strident advocates of democracy and republicanism, the anti-Socialists became antidemocratic and antirepublican.
    The radical rhetoric of the Socialists frightened the Austrian bourgeoisie and peasantry into believing that a proletarian revolution was imminent. In reality there was never a serious possibility of a violent revolution, except possibly by the tiny Austrian Communist party in 1919. Yet the bourgeois fears were sincere, even if unfounded, and helped lead to a conservative and even fascist reaction. Similar developments took place in other European countries between the world wars, above all in Italy and Germany. 33
    The refusal of the Socialists to enter any national government after 1920, together with their inability to win an absolute majority of the votes, meant that the Christian Socials became, by default, the ruling party for most of the First Republic. It also meant that the Socialists lost their influence in the army, police, and civil bureaucracy, something which cost them dearly in future years. 34
    The CSP likewise never succeeded in winning an absolute majority of the ballots. Consequently, it was forced to form unstable coalition governments vvith smaller bourgeois parties like the Greater German People’s party (Gross- deutsche Volkspartei or GVP) and the Agricultural League (Landbund). Every new government was therefore a compromise, which made an energetic policy nearly impossible. Moreover, unlike the SDP, the Christian Socials were not socially homogeneous, consisting instead of genuine democrats, monarchists, capitalists, small shop owners, pan-Germans, and, above all, peasants. Only with great difficulty could these groups be held together; indeed, some of them broke away to join the Nazis in 1932 and thereafter.
    The prospects for success of the new Austrian democracy were, all things considered, tenuous at best. It was bom in an atmosphere of military defeat, political catastrophe, and patriotic humiliation. Conservatives associated it with socialism. The majority of its citizens doubted the permanence and viability of the state. On the fundamental questions of social welfare, church-state relations, and the Anschluss the rival political parties could reach no consensus. Extremists saw their rivals as heretics to be eliminated by one means or another. To top it all, the Great Depression struck Austria in 1930 with an especial ferocity. Thus, by the early 1930s many Austrians were prepared to believe that democracy was corrupt, inefficient, and doomed to failure. Only a fascist or semifascist system, an Anschluss with Germany, or both, could save their homeland. Eager to offer itself as the country’s savior was the Austrian Nazi party.

CHAPTER II NAZIS AND PROTO-NAZIS: FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
    Austrian National Socialism, like the Anschluss movement, had roots that were well established before the First World War. Although the origins of any ideology are notoriously difficult to trace, it would be reasonably safe