tremendous a detonation. One of their number attributed it to at least a thousand tons of dynamite or blasting powder, and other estimates of the quantity of explosives were considerably higher.
Inquiry into the movements of the Akashi Maru showed her to have arrived at Hamburg on January 15, 1931, from Kobe, with a mixed cargo, all of which was thought to have been discharged at the German port. She had then taken on board a full consignment of locomotives and heavy machinery, but there was no record of any explosives having been delivered to the ship at Hamburg. She sailed for Japan on February 5, and had thus taken twenty-six days to cover the run of five thousand miles to Colon — an unusually long time for a ship with an economical speed of ten knots. According to reports by other vessels on the route at approximately the same time, very little bad weather had been met with. The long duration of the Akashi Maru’s voyage lent colour to the theory that she had been met at sea by some ship which had transferred a large quantity of explosives to the big freighter. This view was generally accepted, though no plausible explanation was forthcoming as to how a thousand tons of dynamite could have been stowed away without displacing cargo already in the hold, and in such a way as to remain hidden from the officials who had inspected the ship at Colon. The only other theory which in any way squared with the facts was that the explosives had been deposited on the bed of Culebra Cut by a Japanese steamer which had passed through several days, or even several weeks, previously, and that the Akashi Maru had detonated the charge by some pre-arranged method. But whether those on board had deliberately sacrificed themselves and their ship, or whether, owing to some miscalculation, the explosion had been premature, remains to this day an open question.
Not only the Japanese Government, but the owners of the ship and their agents both in Japan and Europe, have consistently denied all knowledge of the facts or collusion in what was palpably a deep-laid plot for the blocking of the canal on the very eve of war. It is certain, at all events, that the United States Government would have made this outrage a casus belli , even if Japan had refrained from committing other acts of hostility. From the American point of view, the disabling of the Canal was a calamity of the first magnitude, which threatened to ruin all the plans on which the strategical employment of the Navy had been based. While the greater part of the fleet was already in the Pacific, a number of important ships were still in the other ocean, and would now have to make a journey of thirteen thousand miles before reaching their war bases on the West coast.
This, however, was by no means the most serious consequence of the disaster. For several months, at least, it ruled out all the Atlantic coast navy yards as a factor of immediate value in the prosecution of the war. The entire Fleet in the Pacific would have to depend on the resources of local yards for its maintenance, and these were notoriously ill-equipped to supply the needs of a great naval force. Until the Canal was repaired, vast quantities of fuel, stores, and other war material required by the fleet must be shipped to the West Coast via Cape Horn, a voyage of nearly two months for the average cargo steamer, since the railroads would be able to undertake but a relatively small part of this traffic. It was therefore of supreme importance to get the Canal in working order again as quickly as possible. To excavate a passage sufficiently deep and wide for the largest ships would be a task of at least four months, according to the original forecast; actually, owing to further landslides which seemed to mock at the superhuman efforts put forth by all concerned, the work was not finished for six and a half months.
Meanwhile grave loss and disaster were to be suffered in consequence of the initial blow which Japan had
Carol Wallace, Bill Wallance