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matters of diplomacy; but the need of these multitudes of people suffering in Turkey is desperate, and the only hope of influence is the Government of the United States."
    But Lansing had been advised by the Division of Near East Affairs at the State Department that "however much we may deplore the suffering of the Armenians, we cannot take any active steps to come to their assistance at the present time"" Lansing instructed Morgenthau to continue telling the Turkish authorities that the atrocities would "jeopardize the good feeling of the people of the United States toward the people of Turkey.""' Lansing also eventually asked Germany to try to restrain Turkey. But he expressed understanding for Turkey's security concerns. "I could see that [the Armenians'] well-known disloyalty to the Ottoman Government and the fact that the territory which they inhabited was within the zone of military operations constituted grounds more or less justifiable for compelling them to depart their homes," Secretary Lansing wrote in November 1916.°' Morgenthau examined the facts and saw a cold-blooded campaign of annihilation; Lansing processed many of those same facts and saw an unfortunate but understandable effort to quell an internal security threat.
    After twenty-six months in Constantinople, Morgenthau left in early 1916. He could no longer stand his impotence. "My failure to stop the destruction of the Armenians," he recalled, "had made Turkey for me a place of horror-I had reached the end of my resources."42 More than 1 million Armenians had been killed on his watch. Morgenthau, who had earned a reputation as a loose cannon, did not receive another appointment in the Wilson administration. President Wilson, reflecting the overwhelming view of the American people, stayed on the sidelines of World War I as long as he could. And when the United States finally entered the conflict against Germany in April 1917, he refused to declare war on or even break off relations with the Ottoman Empire. "We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us,"Wilson told Congress, "but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others"43 In the end it was Turkey that broke off ties with the United States.
    America's nonresponse to the Turkish horrors established patterns that would be repeated. Time and again the U.S. government would be reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and formally denounce a fellow state for its atrocities.Time and again though U.S. officials would learn that huge numbers of civilians were being slaughtered, the impact of this knowledge would be blunted by their uncertainty about the facts and their rationalization that a firmer U.S. stand would make little difference. Time and again American assumptions and policies would be contested by Americans in the field closest to the slaughter, who would try to stir the imaginations of their political superiors. And time and again these advocates would fail to sway Washington. The United States would offer humanitarian aid to the survivors of "race murder" but would leave those committing it alone.
    Aftermath
    When the war ended in 1918, the question of war guilt loomed large at the Paris peace conference. Britain, France, and Russia urged that state authorities in Germany, Austria, and Turkey be held responsible for violations of the laws of war and the "laws of humanity." They began planning the century's first international war crimes tribunal, hoping to try the kaiser and his German underlings, as well as Talaat, Enver Pasha, and the other leading Turkish perpetrators. But Lansing dissented on behalf of the United States. In general the Wilson administration opposed the Allies' proposals to emasculate Germany. But it also rejected the notion that some allegedly "universal" principle of justice should allow punishment. The laws of humanity, Lansing argued, "vary with the individual." Reflecting the widespread view of