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counterintelligence charter together, General James H. Doolittle was commissioned by Dulles to conduct an outside survey of CIA counterintelligence operations. He concluded that the CIA was losing ground to the KGB and recommended more stringent and ruthless measures be taken against Soviet penetration.
     
         Dulles endorsed the Doolittle Report by ordering a more powerful tool to stop and interdict the moles within the CIA, and he personally chose Angleton to head the CI staff. Perhaps this is why foreign and domestic UFO sighting reports diminished shortly thereafter.
     
         During Dulles’ tenure as DCI from 1953 to 1961 (next Chapter, longest in CIA history), Angleton enjoyed a privileged position (as he did with other future DCIs like McCone and Helms Chapter 3) not shared by other directors despite the fact that he reported to the Deputy Director of Operations [DDO]. On many occasions, he bugged the phones and residences of high ranking U.S. government officials and foreign dignitaries with Dulles’ approval and over the objection of the DDO. If the situation called for it, Angleton could go around proper channels for acquiring personal data on anyone within the CIA and other agencies which was clearly outside of the CIA charter and violated FBI jurisdiction. As the new head of CI, he had to organize a staff, write the rules, and oversee all clandestine operations aimed at Soviet military and security organs of the GRU and KGB (7). The CI staff was primarily tasked with preventing penetrations at home and abroad and protecting CIA operations through careful research and analysis of all incoming intelligence reports. By keeping the most vital and sensitive files to himself, Angleton became a storehouse of secrets, which helped him consolidate his power base. Officially, Angleton was allowed access to everyone’s personnel, operational, and communications files within the CIA.
     
         He reviewed all proposed and active operations and the approval for recruiting agent assets. This did not engender trust or cooperation, but Angleton did not concern himself as he felt the intrusions were needed. One of Angleton’s former Chief of Operations, “Scotty” Miller, expressed the environment in which CI staff operated as one of a “watchdog” snooping around to sniff out either Soviet deception or manipulation.
     
    Angleton and the MJ-12 Directive
     
    Cold War hysteria accompanied the “duck and cover” scare that seemed to grip the nation. No real problems popped up until the 1960 presidential elections when Democratic presidential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy accused the Republican incumbent President Eisenhower of allowing a “missile gap” to exist and charged that the United States was getting too close to the Soviet Union.
     
         Soon after Kennedy became president, he began to needle the CIA for information on UFOs (11) which was unnerving from the outset for Allen Dulles after he was just burned on the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of communist-enslaved Cuba. The once cordial relationship that had existed fell apart and Dulles knew his time as DCI was short (12). 
     
         Dulles knew of the explicit instructions contained in the 24 September 1947 Truman directive; it prohibits the DCI from making disclosures to a chief executive who obviously did not have a “need-to-know.”  Disclosure without a “need-to-know” might not only compromise the CIA, but the lengthy and costly UFO program deemed so necessary to national security by all involved.
     
         This simply could not be jeopardized for any one person, even for the president of the United States. Knowing the character of Allen Dulles and James Angleton, we can only speculate as to what kind of response Kennedy may have received. According to the DCI Top Secret/MJ-12 document, it leaves no doubt that Dulles was not going to fully cooperate with Kennedy’s request, but instead forwarded it to