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ultimate refusal of Iraq to respect it. The application of power and its implications for national interests took precedence for capitals over the health and authority of the only global institution.
    Opinions will remain divided on the legality of the armed action in March 2003 and even more on the political legitimacy – a different question – of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In the international arena there is no final arbiter of these things beyond the moral and political effect of international – and sometimes domestic – opinion. But the Iraq story demonstrates the clear truth that the UN cannot be expected to deal with every international security issue, particularly the most divisive ones. A certain basic unity of purpose amongst its most influential members is essential, especially in an organization where leadership, of the kind societies have come to demand in a national context, is sadly lacking. There is effectively no level of political decision-making in international affairs above the national level, no supranational structure of authority which can outrank the national level, and no independent body to judge and punish departures from the ideals of the UN’s founding fathers. If a state with the power to take unilateral action decides to do so, whether or not the UN approves, the only instrument for resisting it is the opposition of other states. In the case of Iraq, the US had a number of allies willing to take action with it when the Security Council was paralysed, and was able to deflect a charge of unilateralism. Its opponents did not judge the situation as one which they would wish to counter by the use of force: Saddam did not have friends of that kind and the US was, in any case, too powerful. The disapproval of a large number of governments was manifested instead by their reluctance to assist with the aftermath of the conflict and their refusal to characterize the efforts of the Coalition in Iraq as fully legitimate. The UN did try to help the Coalition at the edges through the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, 10 but the bomb attack on the UN’s Headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, which tragically killed Sergio Vieira de Mello and many members of his team, cut away the capacity and enthusiasm of the UN to play a role on the ground and made the international atmosphere that much more bitter. The task of the Coalition leaders in Iraq since April 2003 was made more difficult as a result.
    The consequences of the Iraq intervention are still evolving. The damage done to the reputation of the UN by its failure to find a collective way to bring Saddam Hussein to order may prove to have been mitigated by perceptions of the travails suffered by the coalition countries because of the absence of UN and broad international support. UN agents were shown to have had a more accurate and professional view of the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction than the US and the UK. The final effect of the invasion, if it transpires that Iraq eventually achieves a better condition than it might have done undisturbed, may turn out to have been, in net terms, beneficial. But there is no doubt that the issue has been an explosive one and the limits of the UN’s effectiveness, however subjectively perceived, clearly exposed.
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    There are other issues which the UN has not been able to handle successfully because of the strength of national interests involved. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, for instance, looks like a classic case for international diplomacy. India, however, the majority of whose population would regard UN intervention as an unacceptable indication that there was a case to arbitrate, has steadfastly refused to allow the Security Council to place Kashmir on its agenda. While not a Permanent Member of the Council, India carries enough weight, and can find enough support from within the P5, to wield an effective veto on