immediate rewards of loot and plunder, but subject populations represented the most durable and sustainable dividends of an
imperial conquest. In time, most eventually developed new methods
of resisting central authority, but the Romans were particularly adept
Roman
Britain 23
at creating sustainable bureaucratic systems to draw this process out
and make the most effi cient use of their enormous subject population.
From the top down, these institutions seem rational and relatively
benign, but in reality it took intimidation, naked force, and institutionalized slavery to produce all the grand monuments and cultural
achievements of the ancient world.
Popular histories of Rome ignore these realities because Roman
subjects are largely missing from the historical record. Ancient historians and geographers such as Strabo, Tacitus, Cassius Dio, Suetonius,
and Zosimus provide rich and colorful accounts of Roman empire
building, but their descriptions of the “barbarians” who became the
subjects of the empire cannot be taken at face value. Concerned primarily with domestic issues, classical authors used the empire as a
backdrop for critiques of Roman politics and society. Epigraphs, legal
texts, bronze copies of discharge diplomas, and census data help to
contextualize and correct the classical historians. Archaeology is also
particularly helpful because it shows how people actually lived rather
than what others said about them. But many archaeologists are drawn
to grand monuments and stately villas, and too few pay attention to
the Roman conquest’s violence and disruption. Consequently, simple
farmsteads and urban dwellings remain largely unexamined.
There is therefore no comprehensive picture of what it meant to
be a common Roman subject. A careful reading of the ancient historians in fact suggests that the Romans themselves knew very little
about the peoples of the empire, regardless of how long they ruled
them. Indeed, it is almost certain that Roman offi cials and tax collectors were no more successful in governing captive territory directly
than their more modern successors were.
This fogginess surrounding the realities of the Roman past
allowed succeeding generations of historians and theorists to follow
Tacitus and Cassius Dio in reinterpreting the Roman Empire to speak
to contemporary concerns. In the early modern Andes, Spanish conquerors used Roman imperial analogies to understand and govern the
conquered Inkan Empire. Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire voiced worries about the decline of the fi rst British
Empire in the late eighteenth century. A century later, late Victorian
and Edwardian imperial enthusiasts imagined themselves the heirs of
a grand imperial Rome that had uplifted their Iron Age ancestors.2
24 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
As the dominant force in the ancient world for more than fi ve
centuries, Rome exemplifi ed imperial power and became a yardstick
for westerners to measure the empires that succeeded it. The Roman
Empire was therefore a blank slate. Variously, the Rome of Cicero
and Virgil stood for high culture, Caesar’s assassination was a triumph of republican virtues, Augustus’s principate embodied imperial greatness, and the excesses of Caligula and Nero were cautionary
tales about the corrupting infl uences of imperial power.3 Rome thus
is the starting point for today’s debates over the nature and effi cacy
of empire building.
In contrast to the liberal western empires of the twentieth century that pretended to govern in the interests of their subjects, the
Romans made no apology for expanding imperium Romanum by
violence and conquest. They also did not initially see any incompatibility between empire building and their democratic institutions. It
was actually the Roman republic that built the imperium Romanum .
Invoking Rome’s destiny for universal rule, the republican statesman
Cicero declared in 56 b.c. that “it has now