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basically ignored the Congress and concentrated on his administrative strategy (ibid., 123). As Nathan describes it,
The "traditional legislative strategy" of governing was abandoned and a "fundamentally different approach" was adopted. The new strategy . . . would be designed "to take over the bureaucracy and take on Congress." This would be accomplished . . . by placing Nixon's "own trusted appointees in positions to manage directly key elements of the bureaucracy . . . The new appointees would be the President's men. The bureaucracy would report to them; they would be held accountable." (Cole and Caputo 1979, 400-01)
The first step was to remove the independent power base of cabinet officials. In the process, the cabinet itself receded into grayness. With the full deployment of the Nixon strategy,
No longer would the cabinet be composed of men with national standing in their own right. . . . The president's mentrusted lieutenants, tied closely to Richard Nixon and without national reputations of their ownwere to be placed in direct charge of the major program bureaucracies of domestic government. (Nathan 1975, 7-8)
Nixon's administrative strategy beyond the cabinet was two-pronged: it involved taking more control over both subcabinet political appointments and the career civil service. Initially, the White House had given cabinet members responsibility for selection of their subordinates, telling them they should choose subordinates on the basis of ability first and loyalty second. However, this changed in late 1970 when Frederick V. Malek, former deputy undersecretary of HEW, joined the administration as associate director of OMB. His "forte at HEW had been the removal and Siberian placement of troublesome officials" and their replacement by more

 

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compliant ones. His function at the White House was no different. Under his direction "the White House role in the selection and approval of key agency officials would be much stronger. . . . By the end of Richard Nixon's first term, the original strong cabinet model had been fully displaced" (ibid., 50-51).
Control extended to performance in new ways, as well. Malek took to visiting agencies to assess personally how PASs were doing. He had "points of contact" within many of the agencies to deal with recruiting and serve as liaisons with his office. "Later, to further solidify his grip on the bureaucracy, Nixon loyalists were strategically planted in departments and agencies as overseers of administration policy" (Bonafede 1987a, 40-41).
At the same time the White House was moving to exert more control over political appointments in the agencies, OMB was being strengthened and politicized, and Ehrlichman's White House counterbureaucracy for domestic affairs was being established. The White House intended to get deeply into the operational workings of the agencies. One result of this centralizing strategy was an overload at the White House. To deal with it, Nixon turned increasingly to his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, who operated in the hierarchical manner that further contributed to the president's isolation.
Then, immediately after his reelection, Nixon turned on his own cabinet. In what Hess calls "perhaps the most remarkable statement ever made by a president who has just been re-elected," Nixon declared that he had lost confidence in the people he had called to serve him and that a major overhaul of the government was imminent. "Having realized the failure of his counter-bureaucracy, he nonetheless did not blame himself or his practice of isolation and remote-control government, but instead chose a strategy of massive restructuring and personnel shuffling" (Hess 1988, 126).
First, he demanded the pro forma resignation of his entire cabinet. Next, just before Christmas 1972, Nixon "announced 57 resignations and 87 other personnel decisions." As a "technique for prolonging the vitality of political appointees," the reorganization might have made some sense, but