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Egyptian protesters were eager to achieve.
    The interim government recognized that the emerging power of the Muslim Brotherhood might lead to one of its own becoming the next leader of Egypt, so the government moved quickly to consolidate forces with Islamist groups, both inside and outside of Egypt. The interim government began to foster a new and improved relationship with Iran and allowed the passage of Iranian warships through the Suez Canal. It also opened the previously sealed Rafah border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, making it much easier for weapons to be smuggled in to threaten Israel. While the streets in Egypt were still on fire with hopes for democracy, the interim government had brokered a reconciliation treaty in Cairo between the leaders of Hamas and Fatah for a unity government. Egypt's new alliances with Hamas and Iran were a clearly hostile move in its “cold peace” relationship with Israel. None were good signs for peace, freedom, and democracy.
    A nationalist mood has evolved, with people expressing hostilities against Israel similar to those of the Nasser era. It reminds me of my youth in Egypt during his time. Yet this new Nasserite movement has arisen around an Islamist core that could be much more radical and dangerous than the one under the Nasser regime. Islamist thugs are everywhere, threatening anyone who rebels against Islamic principles. This includes violence against shop owners who sell alcohol, even if it is to the Christian population.
    The situation in Tunisia was different to begin with. It has always been a unique country in the Arab world, in its ability to reject radical Islam and maintain a law against polygamy. As a result, Tunisia has suffered through many attempts by outside Islamist groups to bring down its antipolygamy laws.
    After the country's moderate leadership stepped down, the system was soon challenged by Islamists. In January 2011, a Tunisian Islamist leader, Rached Ghannouchi, returned to Tunisia from London, where he had lived in exile for about twenty years. Ghannouchi had founded an Islamist organization in 1981 named “Ennahda,” which was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. His arrival in Tunisia after the revolution was celebrated by thousands of people. Although the threat from Islamists in Tunisia is not as devastating as in Egypt, in July 2011 they stormed into a cinema in the capital city of Tunis to stop the screening of Neither God nor Master , a film that promotes secularism. Whether it is in Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen, Egypt, or even Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda is already congratulating Islamists everywhere for giving it a great opportunity. The revolutions and the removal of pro-Western Arab regimes have empowered the terrorist movement. All Islamist groups, and they are many, believe that with the Arab Spring, there is an opportunity to revive the caliphate state, or the Ummah. Only time will tell whether they will ever achieve their dreams, but there is no doubt that the Islamist movement has benefited from and been empowered by the uprisings.
    The death of bin Laden was another indicator of the force of Islamism, exposing beyond any doubt how powerful and popular Islamism is and how weak moderates are in the Middle East. As I described in chapter 1, almost no one in the Middle East rejoiced at his death, and this was the man whom many Muslims accused of having hijacked Islam and given it a bad name. The truth of how Muslims actually felt about him became obvious in the many eulogies that could be found all over the Internet. It is naive to believe that Islamist leaders have little support, when in reality they are often looked up to as heroes and are considered the vanguard of Islam. Even the most popular Arab TV station, Al Jazeerah, aired a program about bin Laden that was very respectful and complimentary, a tribute to his life. We can understand why the United States did not surrender his body to his people, because his tomb would have been made