when recounting his approach to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah on the morning of October 16, 1916, wrote, âThe heat of Arabia came out like a drawn sword and struck us speechless.â
His presence there had come about almost by chance. Four months earlier, and after protracted secret negotiations with British authorities in Cairo, Emir Hussein, ruler of the Hejaz region of central Arabia, had launched an Arab revolt against the Turks. Initially matters had gone well. Catching the Turks by surprise, Husseinâs rebels seized the holy city of Mecca along with Jeddah, but there the rebellion had foundered. By October, the Turks remained in firm control of the Arabian interior, including the city of Medina, and appeared poised to crush the rebels. When Lawrence learned that a friend in Cairo was being dispatched to Arabia to gauge the crisis, he arranged a temporary leave from his desk job to tag along.
Over the course of that 10-day visit, Lawrence managed to fully insinuate himself in the Arab rebel cause, and to win the confidence of Husseinâs chief battlefield commander, his third son, Faisal. In short order, Lawrence was appointed the British Armyâs temporary liaison to Faisal, a posting that soon became permanent.
Having used his time in Carchemish to study the clan and tribal structure of Arab society, Lawrence intuitively grasped the delicate negotiating process necessary to win tribal leaders over to the rebel cause. Whatâs more, waging war in early-twentieth-century Arabia revolved around the same primal issuesâwhere an army on the move might find water and forage for its animalsâas the wars of fourteenth-century Europe that Lawrence had so thoroughly studied at Oxford. Very quickly, Faisal came to regard the young British officer as one of his most trusted advisers, as Lawrence, donning the robes of an Arab sheik, assumed a position of honor in tribal strategy sessions. With British naval help, the Arabs captured a succession of Turkish-held towns along the Red Sea coast, while Lawrence organized guerrilla raids against the inland Hejaz Railway.
But Faisalâs young liaison officer also harbored a guilty secret. From his time in Cairo, Lawrence was aware of the extravagant promises the British government had made to Hussein in order to raise the Arab Revolt: full independence for virtually the entire Arab world. What Lawrence also knew was that just months after cementing that deal with Hussein, Britain had entered into a secret compact with its chief ally in the war, France. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the future independent Arab nation was to be relegated to the wastelands of Arabia, while all the regions of valueâIraq, greater Syriaâwere to be allocated to the imperial spheres of Britain and France. As Lawrence recruited ever more tribes to the cause of future Arab independence, he became increasingly conscience-stricken by the âdead letterâ promises he was making, and finally reached a breaking point. His first act of seditionâand by most any standards, a treasonous oneâwas to inform Faisal of the existence of Sykes-Picot. His second would lead to the greatest triumph of his career: the capture of Aqaba.
By the early spring of 1917, talk of a joint British-French amphibious landing at the small fishing port of Aqaba gained great currency among the Allied leadership in Cairo. Aqaba was both the Turkish enemyâs last outpost on the Red Sea and a natural gatewayâat least so it appeared on a mapâto the southern reaches of Syria, the heartland of the Arab world.
Modern Aqaba is a sprawling city of 140,000, its dense downtown giving way to new subdivisions, shopping malls, and office complexes steadily expanding over its foothills. If King Abdullah II of Jordan has his way, the expansion wonât slow any time soon. Reflecting the kingâs vision for converting his nationâs only seaport into a world-class economic and