into a battlefield for Middle Easterners, and the Israelis had a continental headquarters in Paris that moved later to Brussels. Only rarely were murderous incursions made into Arab nations.
As far as Dagan and the Mossad were concerned, assassinations were a legitimate tactic, but not an objective in and of themselves. They had to be considered part of a comprehensive strategy, one of many tools in the multi-pronged battle against Iran.
In a meeting in 2007 with a U.S. official, Dagan did not give details of any acts of violence. But he did urge America to join immediately in a “five-pillar” plan to destabilize the ayatollahs’ regime. The pillars were listed as “political approach,” “covert measures,” “counterproliferation,” “sanctions,” and “force regime change.”
Encouraging the Mossad’s research department not to leave high-level analysis to Aman—so that he could hear from what the Bible called a “multitude of counselors”—Dagan engaged his staff in discussion of all the factors to consider.
Dagan was a great believer in the potency of international pressure, especially sanctions. He told Mossad staff members, during analytic discussions, that economic factors in the modern world were powerful. He explained that he carefully studied the motivations of American presidents in formulating foreign policy and realized that the United States went to war in Iraq—twice—because of its energy interests.
Dagan thus reached the conclusion that the U.S. would not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons—not only out of concern that a messianic Shi’ite regime might use the bomb or intimidate Israel—but mainly because Iran would become the most powerful nation among energy producers.
He figured that a nuclear Iran would vastly expand its sphere of influence to the south and west, to envelop Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates; and also to the north and east to such secular Muslim countries as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
According to this scenario, Iran could then control 60 percent of the global energy market. The United States, in the world according to Dagan, would not permit that to happen.
In any event, U.S. military capabilities were many times more powerful than Israel’s. Dagan favored, and even predicted, a situation where Israel would not need to stand alone. If there was no other way to stop—or keep delaying—the Iranians, then the best solution to him would be for the huge American military to strike at the nuclear facilities.
After Dagan retired in December 2010, he told the Israeli news media—breaking his years of silence—that if Israel were to attack Iran, it would be “the stupidest thing I’ve ever heard.” Just over a year later, he told CBS’s 60 Minutes that he trusted President Barack Obama. “The military option is on the table, and he is not going to let Iran become a nuclear state,” Dagan said on CBS.
Dagan added that the issue “is not an Israeli problem; it’s an international problem.” He confirmed, too, that if he wanted anyone to attack Iran, “I will always prefer that Americans will do it.”
Obama, however, seemed to be delaying any military moves for as long as he possibly could. Yet, in part because he was facing re-election in 2012, the president aligned himself with Israel in declaring that it would be unacceptable for Iran—as an oppressive nation supporting terrorist groups—to possess nuclear weapons.
Although he had personality and policy clashes with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, when they gave separate speeches to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (the powerful pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC), in Washington in March 2012, Obama practically echoed the Israeli leader’s worrying analysis: that if Iran were to become a nuclear power, other countries in the Middle East would rush to build their own matching arsenals. Turkey, perhaps Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf sheikdoms would