question of who would be the successors to the French. Its declaration divided Vietnam into two countries: Communist North Vietnam and independent South Vietnam. But the long-term fate of Vietnam and of America in Vietnam was intertwined with the destinies of two leaders: Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem.
If Ho Chi Minhâs popular image is any indication, he must have had the worldâs best public-relations organization working for him. Madison Avenue at its cleverest can only bow in deference. The typical line on Ho runs like this: Ho, though he was a Communist, was first and foremost a nationalist. He was variously described as a charismatic Vietnamese George Washington who led his people against French colonialists; an Asian Tito who turned for help to the Soviet Union and Communist China only after being spurned by American administrations obsessed with the Cold War; and a humanitarian Uncle Ho who preached about the need for liberation, literacy, and land reform.
In fact, Ho Chi Minh was a brilliant fraud who spent his life pretending to be exactly the opposite of what he really was. He was a nationalist only in the sense that he could not establish a Communist state in Vietnam if it was part of the French Empire. His only loyalty was to winning power for himself and his ideology. That made tactical calculations simple. He reasoned that if the French were in power, it meant he was not in power; and that if the French would not put him in power, they would have to be removed from power to make room for him.
There is almost nothing in Hoâs biography to indicate that he placed nationalism above communism. In 1911, at the age of 21, he left Vietnam. While most Vietnamese nationalists exiled themselves to Japan, he went to France. Nine years later, he was a founding member of the French Communist party. He once wrote in the partyâs newspaper, Lâ Humanite , that nationalism, if left uncontrolled, was a âdangerous phenomenonâthat could threaten the spread of communism in colonial areas. In 1923, the Soviets brought him to Moscow, where he was trained and indoctrinated as an agent of the Communist International. The Comintern, as it was called, demanded absolute fidelity to the Soviet Union, even if this required its members to betray their native lands. He spent the next two decades either in Moscow studying the science of revolution at Lenin University or in Southeast Asia practicing it for the Comintern.
Ho formed alliances with virtually all of Vietnamâs nationalist groups, but he never put the common interest above his own. He cooperated with true nationalists only if he could advance his ambitions by doing so. When their interests collided with his, he destroyed them. In 1925, he betrayed Vietnamâs most prominent nationalist, Phan Boi Chau, to the French secret police. Communist histories state that Phan walked right into a trap. But they do not mention that it was Ho who had set it up, for a payoff of 100,000 piasters. At the time, Ho justified his treachery by telling his comrades that Phan was a nationalist, not a Communist, and that as such he would have been a rival in the future.
Those arguing that Ho was a nationalist always point to the appeals he made to the United States on behalf of Vietnam after World War II. Many know that he repeatedly offered to ally himself with us in exchange for our recognizing an independent Vietnam under his leadership. But few know the entire story. His actions were actually nothing more than an ingenious ruse to propel himself to prominence and power in Vietnam.
Ho was virtually unknown to the Vietnamese people during World War II. He knew that to win the postwar struggle for power, he first had to win the support of a foreign power, whether it be the United States, China, or France. He ingratiated himself with several American intelligence officers stationed in Vietnam, plying them with information, charm, and flattery. His tactic worked.
Jasmine Haynes, Jennifer Skully