Read Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings for Free Online Page A

the Navy hymn “Eternal Father” with its reference to “those in peril on the sea.” Afterward, Roosevelt toured the big new battleship, which was fated to be sunk only four months later in the South China Sea by Japanese bombers. Both men reveled in the tour, with Churchill acting the role of guide, showing off the crown jewel of the Royal Navy—
his
Royal Navy—while Roosevelt, an apt and eager student of all things naval, did not have to feign interest. A witness recalled that both the president and prime minister had “a fine time.” 30
    The formal meetings themselves were mostly anticlimactic. Churchill urged Roosevelt to issue a hard-line ultimatum to the Japanese. He had his own purposes in doing so, of course, but Roosevelt demurred. Far from seeking a “back door to war,” Roosevelt wanted to keep the Japanese at arm’s length until Hitler could be dealt with. He told Churchill that rather than back the Japanese into a corner, he wanted to give them a “face saving out.” In the end, Roosevelt sent Japan a somewhat ambiguous note proclaiming only that “further steps in pursuance … of military domination” would compel the United States to safeguard its “legitimate rights and interests.” 31
    During the lengthy Atlantic crossing to Newfoundland, Churchill had prepared a position paper on how the war should be run if and when the United States got into it. His paper envisioned a war characterized by blockade, bombing, subversion, and propaganda. By isolating Germanyfrom the outside, bombing it continually from the air, and constantly appealing to the citizens of the occupied countries to rise up, Churchill implied that Hitler’s empire could be so weakened that it would collapse of its own dead weight. The document paid lip service to “landing forces on the continent,” but only after Germany was on its last legs. Churchill hoped, even expected, that blockade, bombing, and subversion would “destroy the foundation upon which the [German] war machine rests—the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it … and the hopes of victory which inspire it.” Churchill sent copies of this document to Marshall, Stark, and Major General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps. 32
    At the meeting of the senior officers the next day, the Americans exhibited a palpable coolness to Churchill’s vision. To his suggestion that heavy bombers be given the highest production priority, Stark objected that this seemed inappropriate given that shipping was in such peril. Both Stark and Marshall found it odd that there was little mention of aid to the Soviet Union. Did the British not expect the Russians to hold out? The Americans worried, too, that Churchill’s proposals contained only a vague reference to a possible land campaign on the continent, and then only when Germany was tottering and near defeat. It may have been Marshall who wrote this sentence in the American response: “Wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies.” 33
    Despite these apparent fissures in the Anglo-American war planning, the real significance of the meeting at Argentia was the personal connection made between the heads of government, and the only real news to emerge from it was the announcement of the Atlantic Charter. After the moving church service on Sunday, August 10, Roosevelt had suggested to Churchill, “We could draw up a joint declaration laying down certain broad principles which should guide our policies along the same road.” That night, Churchill dictated the first draft of such a declaration, citing eight principles that would guide a postwar settlement, including “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” While offering few specifics, it outlined a vision for a peaceful and prosperous post-war world. 34
    The conference at Argentia marked a new milestone in the emerging Anglo-American