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Saigon, and the delta. The Vietnamese Navy had two major components: the blue-water navy (the large ships that patrolled the China Sea) and the brown-water navy (the riverine forces that patrolled the Mekong Delta and the inland waterways of MR-3 and MR-4). The blue-water fleet had line ships capable of providing supporting fire to land forces as well as combating enemy ships. These ships provided coastal surveillance of the twelve hundred nauticalmiles of coastline to prevent the North from supplying its forces by water and harbor defense to protect the harbors so essential for logistics support. The navy’s tank landing ship fleet, composed of six tank landing ships and two converted cargo carriers modified as troop carriers, was a key element of the navy. This fleet and the air force’s C-130s comprised South Vietnam’s strategic mobility. The late-1973 navy ship inventory included ninety blue-water vessels, 1,450 brown-water vessels, and 265 army watercraft—1,805 total.
    In the 1972 campaign, for the first time, the North Vietnamese Army used armor on a large scale. About four hundred enemy tanks were initially deployed to South Vietnam for the 1972 offensive. There were some further NVA commitments of armor as replacements for combat losses. The enemy’s use of tanks was usually ineffective because they were not part of a combined arms operation utilizing infantry and artillery; rather, the enemy generally used them in small numbers to provide supporting fire for its infantry. Notwithstanding that allied ground, air, and naval actions destroyed almost all of the enemy armor, the NVA recognized the advantages of armor and the necessity for coordinated combined arms tactics. To that effect, in 1973 USSAG aerial reconnaissance detected new shipments of tanks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the stationing of armor in the demilitarized zone area. All intelligence reports indicated major increases in enemy armor capabilities in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The enemy armor threats in MR-1 and MR-3 were of the greatest concern to senior Vietnamese officers, who realized that antiarmor capabilities would be essential against a major attack.
    On 22 September 1973, North Vietnam’s 26th Army Regiment attacked the 80th Ranger Border Defense Battalion in MR-2. The enemy initiated the assault with a heavy artillery bombardment—including 122 mm and 130 mm guns, mortars, and rockets—providing supporting fire for at least six T-54 tanks. Of the 293 men in the ranger battalion, some two hundred were killed or captured. Shortly thereafter, in October, an enemy battalion supported by five T-54 tanks engaged the 2nd Battalion, 40th ARVN Regiment, near Pleiku. It withdrew when confronted by the tanks and fired only one light antiaircraft weapon indefense. From an operational point of view, the situation in late 1973 appeared different than it had been during the 1972 offensive. Reports indicated that the enemy was improving its armor techniques. It was conducting combined arms tactics and had learned how to use armor in the exploitation phase of an attack. But most disturbing was that the ARVN was not standing up to the armor threat.
    To assess the RVNAF antiarmor capabilities, I asked the USSAG J-3 to review source documents to determine the allied efforts against tanks during the 1972 offensive. His assessment included U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical air attacks, B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes, and engagements by the VNAF, U.S. Army helicopters, U.S. naval gunfire, and ARVN ground weapons. 31 Of the tanks reported as destroyed in South Vietnam, 56 percent were destroyed by tactical aircraft, 31 percent by ARVN ground forces, and 13 percent by naval gunfire and other means. However, when VNAF and ARVN kills were added together, clearly, 63 percent of the armor kills could be attributed to the South Vietnamese, that is, 37 percent were attributed to U.S. activities, which would not be a factor in