Read Losing Vietnam for Free Online Page A

Since the cease-fire, the North Vietnamese had had free reign to improve their lines of communication and move troops, equipment, and supplies into South Vietnam. The relief from potential bombing allowed the sophisticated antiaircraft defenses in North Vietnam to move south. Soon there were at least twenty antiaircraft regiments in South Vietnam, which protected the communist supply and storage areas and supported their combat initiatives. The VNAF’s slow-moving helicopters and fixed-wing assets could not cope with the SA-7s and the radar-controlled guns, since they had no electronic countermeasure equipment. Therefore, the air force had to fly A-37 and F-5 aircraft at altitudes of ten thousand feet, and the forward air controllers were completely forced out of the areas of contact.
    Our air experts at Headquarters USSAG cited two major VNAF deficiencies, one equipment-wise and the other organizational as the RVNAF faced the forthcoming dry-season campaign in late 1974 and early 1975. First, the South Vietnamese aircraft assets were configured for low-level intensity combat and could not cope well with the mid-intensity conflict now being waged by the enemy. The initial force-planning structure of the Vietnamese Air Force has been severely criticized for not having provided an electronic countermeasure capability or more advanced aircraft like the F-4. One could presume that the planners were counting on a reduction in combat intensity rather than an acceleration and that they did not want to provide the South with the capability to interdict North Vietnam, thereby violating the cease-fire agreement. Unfortunately, they did not consider the possibility after the cease-fire of North Vietnam’s highly effective antiaircraft units moving south, which turned out to be a game changer.
    The second deficiency was that the air force did not have centralized control over its assets. With the exception of reconnaissance assets,all South Vietnamese squadrons were assigned to the corps. Each corps commander had full control over the tactical air and transport assets assigned to his MR, and he looked upon those assets as
his
air force. The JGS issued directives to the VNAF, which generally followed these only with the acquiescence of the respective corps commander, who, if he desired, would go around the JGS directly to President Thieu. This assignment policy was always a bone of contention with the air force; it violated the basic principle of the flexible use of airpower. 30 With the existing organization, it was difficult for aircraft in one corps to assist in major engagements of another. However, such instances were few. Whenever there was a serious threat, the president could and did step in. More of a problem was that the air force representatives to the corps were generally more junior than their army counterparts and as a consequence often had little impact on the planning of operations. VNAF complained that it was generally utilized solely for protecting ground troops, often bombing (in their opinion) low-priority targets for the psychological effect in lieu of striking enemy troop buildups and storage for petroleum and other supplies. This may have been the case in 1973, but with the enemy antiaircraft buildup to protect such areas, VNAF attacks would have had marginal effect. By and large, army and air force officers functioned very well at the working and intermediate levels of command.
    The Vietnamese Navy played an important but relatively unpublicized role in the war. The main missions the joint staff assigned to the navy—all of which were vital—were logistics mobility, coastal surveillance, and riverine operations. Conscious that it had no strategic reserves, the JGS looked to the navy for its sealift capabilities. The JGS was always careful to retain the ability to move the airborne division and marine brigades in MR-1 and MR-2 to Saigon, should the situation demand the protection of the heartland,