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many.
    Hannibal, acclaimed universally by the army as Hasdrubal’s successor, seems also to have been accepted by the Senate in Carthage without demur, and the personal nature of the Barcid rule in Spain seemed thus confirmed: first Hamilcar, then Hasdrubal the Handsome, and now Hannibal. This led to a somewhat natural misunderstanding of the real situation by the Romans—that the ultimate authority rested with the Carthaginian Senate, and not with Hannibal. When, within three years of taking command, he went to war with Rome he had consulted Carthage in advance. The fact that, when later challenged by Rome, Carthage did not surrender Hannibal as requested but accepted war reveals that there were more influential Carthaginians in favour of a war of revenge on Rome than there were against. The anti-war element, however, always remained strong in Carthage; it was composed not only of enemies of the Barca party but of others who saw a senseless diversion of their country’s new wealth and strength into this expensive military expedition. Yet in the final analysis the judgement of Polybius remains true: ‘Of all that befell both the Romans and the Carthaginians, the cause was one man, and one mind—Hannibal’s.’
     
     

 
    V
     
    THE GREAT DESIGN
     
    Hannibal’s first task on taking command in Spain was to enlarge and consolidate the territorial gains that had been made by his brother-in-law Hasdrubal and his father. Not until he felt that Carthaginian influence was securely established in the area south of the Ebro could he embark upon that great plan which he had always had in mind (if not inherited). As yet, he was not ready for war with Rome. His involvement during the first year, taming the tribesmen in the area of the Tagus in order to secure the river-line behind him, may have served to allay Roman suspicions of his intentions, or to convince them that he had enough problems to cope with in Spain itself. In the following year, 220 B.C., he moved further north again and captured Salmantica (Salamanca).
    A foretaste of Hannibal’s brilliant usage of his cavalry was given to a massive combination of two tribes on the Tagus, where he showed how a brave and much larger enemy force can be confused by a night crossing. Hannibal was always to show that he had an appreciation as a cavalry commander that his enemies never had; at the same time he did not make the mistake of thinking that everything could be left to the horsemen. He knew that their dash and sudden violence must always be reinforced, and ultimately consolidated, by a hard core of disciplined infantry.  
    The cavalry that he used in Spain, and later in France and Italy, consisted of two basic units, still found centuries later—the heavy brigade and the light brigade. The heavy brigade was composed of Celtiberians, and later of Gauls, riding the powerful horses of the country, and having as weapons a short lance that could double as a javelin and a two-edged sword, slightly curved so as to make it suitable to cut as well as thrust. The light brigade was formed by the Numidian horsemen from North Africa. They were akin to those Arab horsemen who were to inflict such casualties upon the Crusaders many centuries later: mounted on wiry small horses, lightly armed, accustomed to mountains and desert alike, they were used to harass the enemy and then withdraw, creating among infantrymen a state of confusion which the heavy brigade could then exploit. Another arm which was to prove disconcerting to the Romans was provided by the famous Balearic slingers (whom Rome was later to incorporate into her own armies). These consisted of a corps of ‘Davids’, hurling round stones or lead bullets, who would open fire in the early stages of any conflict, withdrawing to join the light infantry before the major engagement took place.
    The main body of the infantry, drawn from Carthage, Libya, and now Spain, were heavily armed in the Greek fashion with large shields,