Read Eichmann, Bureaucracy and the Holocaust for Free Online Page A

it is vital to remember that we are talking about the redeployment of morality rather than its negation: it would be incorrect to assume that Eichmann became amoral as such. Rather, as a consequence of the public/private split, fixed jurisdictional areas, chain of command, and functional division of labour his moral judgements and concerns were deflected toward his own personal activities and conduct, being "forcefully shifted in another direction - the job to be done and the excellence with which it is performed" (Bauman, 1989, p.159). This is another example of the dysfunctional and irrational consequences of bureaucracy cited by Merton, producing what Bauman (1989, p.101) calls "technical morality", a form that differs from moral responsibility inasmuch as "it forgets that the action is a means to something other than itself … the bureaucrat's own act becomes an end in itself". Concomitantly, Landau (1992, p.9) notes the extent to which this concern with technical morality can be reinforced by the approval and recognition of superiors. In relation to the activities of Treblinka commandant Franz Stangel he observes that "as long as he received the approval of his superiors he would aim for and reach quite remarkable standards of efficiency … it is a syndrome that will perhaps be familiar to many who have worked in a bureaucratic organisation" (ibid, p.187). This concern with performance, standards, achievement and detail thus serves as a surrogate for the kind of morality practised in everyday life. The process impedes the bureaucrat's ability to associate action with consequence, prevents the emergence of what Arendt (1994, p.106) refers to as "instinctive animal pity" and pushes the 'big picture' even farther into the background.
     
    The above goes some way towards explaining an extensively cited example of Eichmann's activities, concerning an incident that occurred in Paris sometime in June 1942. From the Nazis' perspective the French proved somewhat problematic, for although they welcomed the deportation of foreign Jews from their territory they did not regard French-born Jews as a problem. This rendered negotiations delicate, frustrating affairs. Having finally received the order to commence the deportation of French Jewry, Eichmann's arrangements were subsequently derailed by the French authorities' failure to concentrate the Jews so as to facilitate their deportation. Having obtained the necessary rolling stock with great difficulty, Eichmann found himself unable to fill the trains and was forced to cancel the action. According to Röthke (a IV-B-4 representative based in Paris), Eichmann described the affair as a "disgrace" and a "matter of great prestige" insofar as it affected his standing with the French, the Transport Ministry and his reputation more generally. Tellingly, Röthke also records that Eichmann was afraid to report the fiasco to his superior, Heinrich Müller (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.132-3; Gilbert, 1987, p.376; Arendt, 1994, pp.163-4).
     
    While often interpreted and reported as a prime example of Eichmann's inhumanity, as proving his testimony to be nothing more than lies and distortions, there is nonetheless a striking correlation with Bauman and Landau's assertions. Concerned only with his reputation, with the extent to which this failure represented a slip from his usual high standards and a black mark on his record, Eichmann's response is exactly what one would expect from someone suffering from this form of moral corruption. And, of course, the fear Eichmann expresses at the thought of having to report the matter to his superior also tallies with Landau's claim that approval and recognition (and their opposites) are major reinforcing factors. As such, these points suggest that one can have the highest personal standards, the greatest concern with propriety, not to mention a 'normal' human response to praise and congratulations, and yet still express disappointment and dismay at