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defeating the Celtiberians. Dis­illusion was widespread. Officers refused to volunteer for the peninsula; veteran soldiers declined to march with their leaders. To the consternation of a society which regarded army service as a cause for pride, the number of youths evading en­listment was so great that punishment became impossible.
    For the first time in a century, the senate had lost its grip on men and methods.
    At the same time, Rome complained that Carthage was re­building an army and naval force. The African city's dispute with Numidia had reached flashpoint, embassies and counter- embassies scuttling to Italy for crisis talks. Probably, a Carth­aginian army of some size had evolved from the territorial skirmishes coinciding with the resurgence of the popular party. Half a century of Numidian encroachment underlined the need for it. Fighting ships were less important. Masinissa's was not a seafaring nation, and it is doubtful if Carthage projected a large fleet.  In a calmer moment, the formal protest Rome presented at these breaches of a somewhat dated treaty might have led to satisfaction. But the hour was fraught for both sides. That year, Carthage was due to pay the final instalment of the war in­demnity. The knowledge that she would then have a substan­tial surplus revenue to devote to other things, possibly armaments, did nothing to relieve the trauma occasioned in Rome by bitter Spanish setbacks. Suddenly, the Roman climate, xenophobic, vindictive, favoured Cato's call for violent action.
    In Carthage, an atmosphere of mounting crisis overrode Roman strictures as public indignation centred on the op­probrious Numidians. Late in 151, the government, losing patience, expelled the leading members of the pro-Masinissa faction in the city and, prompted by Carthalo and other fervent nationalists, insultingly rejected the king's protests. The popular party denied his envoys entry to Carthage and even attacked them on their way home.
    Having threatened for decades, the conflict exploded.
    Masinissa promptly attacked a town of Carthaginian con­nection named Oroscopa, while forces under Carthalo and another captain, Hasdrubal, marched against the king. Masin­issa was now almost ninety. Anticipating his death, the princes he had ruled with patriarchal rigidity jockeyed for the dynastic struggle they saw ahead. Two of his sons joined Hasdrubal, doubtless hopeful of repayment in kind later.
    Weakened by the desertions, Masinissa withdrew to a region remote from Carthaginian supply routes. Confidently, Hasdrubal followed. A number of preliminary engagements had gone his way and he sought the major battle. It remains, in its obscurity, one of the phantom epics of Africa, remarked chiefly for the presence of a notable spectator: a young Roman officer seeking elephants for the Spanish war.
    The son of a distinguished soldier (Aemilius Paullus, con­queror of Macedon) and adopted member of the Scipionic family, the talented Scipio Aemilianus had already won a name for intrepidity in Spain when he found himself perched on a hillside in North Africa watching a sprawling battle on the plain below. He relished the experience. 'It was a privilege,' he declared later, 'such as only two had enjoyed before me, Zeus from the top of Mount Ida and Poseidon from Samothrace, in the Trojan War.'Masinissa, grey from more years even than Cato, commanded the Numidians in person, riding without saddle or stirrups in the native style. But the day proved indecisive, and the Roman witness was at length asked to mediate. Negotiations faltered over the deserters, Masinissa demanding the surrender of his sons, the Carthaginians refusing to co-operate. Imprudently, since the terrain itself was hostile, Hasdrubal postponed break­ing camp in expectation of further talks.
    They failed to materialize. Instead, the Carthaginians dis­covered that the artful Numidian had exploited the delay to blockade their return routes. Trapped in barren country,