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Langangke said: ‘It did not seem impossible that we could defeat the invasion. We did not then realize that not all Germany was fighting as we were.’ It has sometimes been suggested that the Das Reich in June 1944 was so weakened by its large intake of recruits of doubtful enthusiasm that it could have played no important role in Normandy, even had it arrived much earlier on the battlefield. In reality, its deficiencies of training and equipment were no worse than those of most other Panzer divisions in France at that period. It was better equipped with tanks and assault guns than most of its counterparts. Lammerding reported to Army Group G that 2nd SS Panzer was ‘conditionally ready for battle’.
    Sadi Schneid, the young Alsatian recruit who wrote a fascinating personal memoir after the war for SS veterans’ consumption, testifies that many of the Alsatians were indeed lukewarm in their enthusiasm for the war, but intensive training and the fierce spirit of the SS had imbued an astonishingly high proportion with adetermination to do whatever was expected of them. He described an evening in their barracks, when his company of the reconnaissance battalion returned from an anti-terrorist sweep. Their senior NCO, Hauptscharführer ‘Hascha’ Kurz, a formidable veteran of the Eastern Front, was relieved and delighted that not one of his motley crew of Volksdeutsche , former prisoners of war and green Alsatians, had attempted to desert while they had the chance to do so, in open country. He made a speech to them:
    ‘Boys, if the Americans land one day, they won’t be throwing potatoes, and I’m going to need all of you. That’s why I keep emphasizing to you that I don’t need dead heroes but live ones. Remember everything I’ve taught you in training. A fraction of a second’s carelessness at the front, and it’ll do for you. Once again, I urge you – trust me. If you do what I do, you’ve got a chance of coming out of it. Always obey my finger and my eye, and you’ll thank yourselves later. I’ll guarantee to do everything I can to keep your skins in one piece. Can I count on you?’
    ‘JAWOHL, HAUPTSCHARFÜHRER!’, we shouted in chorus, from the bottom of our hearts. ‘SIEG HEIL! SIEG HEIL! SIEG HEIL!’
    One might have imagined us at Munich, after an oration from Hitler himself.

 
2 » SOE: BAKER STREET
     
    For the men and women of the French Resistance, D-Day was the decisive moment of the war. After years in which their potential power and enthusiasm had been doubted and disputed in London and Washington, now they were to be put to the test. Resistance did not wage a continuous four-year guerilla struggle against the Germans. Only late in 1941 and early in 1942 did a small number of French people begin to stir from the terrible lethargy and trauma of defeat. Clandestine opposition newspapers were printed. There were cautious meetings of handfuls of like-minded enemies of Vichy. Very many of these courageous pioneers were caught and shot, but others followed. The early handfuls began to grow into a hundred, a thousand independent Resistance groups and escape lines. Each began to develop its own links with one of many interested organizations in London – the British-run French Section of SOE, MI6, MI9, De Gaulle’s BCRA and later the American OSS. These links, often forged by the chance of a brief encounter or an exchange of names, determined whether a circuit spent the remainder of the war gathering information, assisting escaping prisoners or preparing for open battle against the Germans. Despite the brief effective existence of a National Council for Resistance under the brilliant Jean Moulin in 1943, after his capture the quest for unity flagged, and in the interests of security this was probably fortunate. Until the end, Resistance remained a patchwork of overlapping and often mutually hostile independent networks. The British and French officers parachuted to provide arms and liaison with