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Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 219.
    9     Ibid.
    10 Md., 225.
    II     Ibid. , 229.
    12 You Ji, ‘A Test Case for China’s Defense and Foreign Policies,” Contemporar y Southeast Asia, March 1995, vol.16, no. 4, 377.
    13    You, “A Test Case for China’s Defense and Foreign Policies,” 378-379.
    14    William W. Bain, “Sino-Indian Military Modernization: The Potential for Destabilization,” Asian Affairs, fall 1994, vol.21,no. 3,135.
    15     Ibid. , 136.
    16    You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defense and Foreign Policies,” 380.
    17    Huth, Standing Your Ground, 7.
    18    Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds) DoubleEdged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 436.
    19    Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making,
    and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 510-525.     '
    20    Rosemary Foot, “From Deterrence To Reassurance?: Cooperative Security in Asia and the Chinese Response,” paper presented at the Center for International Studies, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,16 April 1996.
    21    Major works in this genre include Arthur Samuel Lall, Modern International Negotiations: principles and practices (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior: A Briefing Analysis (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 1985); and Lucian Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles (New Jersey: Greenwood Publishers, 1992).
    22    Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” International Organization, summer 1988, vol.42, no. 3, 423-460.
    23    Lyle J. Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly, December 2001, no. 168, 985-997.
    24    Y. B. Chavan, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Frank Cass, 1979),19.
    25    International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) Boundary and Security Bulletin, Autumn 1999, 38.
    26    “Vietnam’s Government Defends Border Agreement with China,” Associated Press, 3 April 2002.
    27     Jane's Foreign Report, 2627, 8 February 2001.
    28     Ibid., 459.
    29    Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Beyond Two-level Games: Domestic-international Interaction in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Negotiations,” International Organization , autumn 1993, vol.47, no. 4, 605. Knopf went on to explore the implications for state government negotiations by taking into account three (societal, state and regime) levels of analysis. However, since regimes as a common set of norms, rules and expectations which governs inter-state behavior are not at present established among the countries of East Asia, I will not consider the third (regime) level of analysis in applying the traditional “two-level games” concept.
    30    Janice Gross Stein, “The Political Economy of Security Agreements: The Link Costs of Failure at Camp David,” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 77-103.
    31    Carol Hamlin, “Domestic Component and China’s Evolving Three World Theory,” in Lillian Harris and Robert Worden (eds) China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger (Dover MA: Auburn House, 1986), 50-51.
    32    Zhao Quansheng, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996),19.
    33     Ibid. , 23.

2 The two-level game hypothesis
    Toward a theory of