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colonies of many poorer citizens with the consequent increase in the influence of the remaining landholding nobility, and partly to the complication of business which forced the Senate and magistrates to take the initiative. Further, the average Roman was not much interested in politics. Elections generally meant merely a change in the executive magistrates, not in the policy of the state: the legislative assemblies and the Senate, which determined Rome’s policy, remained the same. As long as the government protected his interests the small farmer cared little about the form of that government. Some of the nobility might be inspired by abstract Greek theories of government, a tribune might be a progressive democrat or the tool of the conservatives, but while his daily life ran smoothly the average farmer or town worker worried less about who governed him than about the efficiency and justice of that government. Thus at the very moment that the theoretical powers of the Roman people were emphasized and a real democracy was within their grasp, they in fact succumbed more and more to the control of the senatorial oligarchy.

Part II
ROME AND CARTHAGE

X
SCIPIO AND ROME’S OFFENSIVE
    1. SCIPIO’S CONQUEST OF SPAIN
    After the disaster of the two Scipios in 211 the Romans lost all Spain south of the Ebro, including presumably Saguntum, while the survivors clung precariously to the Ebro line. Had the Scipios been killed a year earlier, the situation would indeed have been calamitous; but the fall of Syracuse and Capua facilitated the sending of reinforcements. The appointment of Claudius Nero, who had long served in Italy under Fabius’ cautious strategy, suggests that the government envisaged a purely defensive strategy in Spain. Indeed, with his few troops Nero could hardly have acted otherwise. Landing late in 211 he tried during the next year to secure the land north of the Ebro; his hold on the interior was slender, though he possibly caused Hasdrubal Barca some trouble.
    But a defensive attitude in Spain might not prevent the ultimate breakthrough of overwhelming forces. A return to the offensive strategy of the Scipios was indicated, if the man to direct it could be found; and who was more fitting to avenge the Scipios than the son of Publius, the future conqueror of Hannibal? Aged twenty-five, courageous, resourceful, self-confident and wise, the young P. Scipio had an extraordinary power of inspiring confidence in others. His character was a blend of the man of action and the religious mystic; his unusual enthusiasm was moderated by Greek culture and Roman common sense. He had fought in Italy, but as he had only held the aedileship (in 213) he was not qualified for a high command. The details of his election are obscure, but he was enthusiastically nominated by the people to a proconsular command in Spain, and the Senate wisely acquiesced. Constitutional precedent was neglected; Scipio was the first privatus to be invested withproconsular Imperium . His colleague, M. Junius Silanus, possessed only propraetorian imperium . Late in 210 he sailed with reinforcements to Spain where his total force, including the Spanish allies, was over 30,000 men.
    Scipio spent the winter organizing his army and planning one of the most daring exploits of Roman history. So far from remaining on the defensive, he would strike at the enemy’s heart by swooping on their base, New Carthage (Cartagena). Its capture would be of immense value. It contained the bulk of the Carthaginians’ money and war material and their hostages from the whole of Spain; its harbour was one of the best in the western Mediterranean; and it would give Scipio a base from which to conquer the south. Inheriting the strategic ideals of his father, he realized that a base was essential and that his father had failed because Saguntum was not far enough south. His plan was possible because the three Carthaginian generals were still on bad terms and had wintered apart,